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in estimating the exchange rate channel is discussed in section three. Section four discusses the 
results from the empirical analysis. Section five concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical literature
The transmission mechanism of the exchange rate works directly through its impact on import 
prices aggregate demand via net exports (Ramos-Francia & Sidaoui, 2008: 369). The analysis of 
this channel of transmission can be divided into two parts: (i) the pass-through from the policy 
interest rate to the exchange rate and (ii) the pass-through from the exchange rate to the real 
economy.
Pass-through from the policy interest rate to the exchange rate: A policy rate change by the 
central bank also induces a change on return on domestic investments relative to foreign 
investments. The interest rate differential leads to capital outflows and affects the relative 
exchange rate. Therefore, central banks make serious attempts to keep the interest rate 
differential stable to facilitate capital account stability and to keep the bilateral exchange rate 
from being too volatile for the economy.
Pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation and the real economy: Changes in the exchange 
rate are directly transmitted to the consumer price through the cost of imported inputs and 
finished goods. However, the magnitude and speed of the pass-through depend on prevailing 
demand conditions, price adjustment costs and the perceived persistence of the 
depreciation/appreciation. The indirect transmission has lag effects through changes in the levels 
of demand (between domestic goods and import substitutes). This comes as a result of shifts in 
the country’s external competitiveness or inflation expectations (Ramos-Francia & Sidaoui, 
2008: 369).
It is generally known that the exchange rate channel examines the relationship between net 
private capital inflows and monetary policy. There are variant exchange rate regimes but for 
simplicity’s sake two extreme categories are referred to in this discussion, namely the fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes. Karamanou, Mahadeva, Robinson and Syrichas (n.d.) discussed 
the two alternatives. Under a flexible exchange rate regime monetary tightening, for example via 
an interest rate rise, makes domestic currency deposits more attractive. This leads to a currency 
appreciation. The appreciation of a currency means the currency has gained value. The high 
value of the currency makes domestic goods more expensive than foreign goods. This has a 
negative impact on net exports because an appreciation causes a fall in net exports and 
consequently aggregate output. However, under the alternative regime or a system of fixed 
exchange rates with no capital controls, monetary tightening or a rise in interest rates will cause 
capital inflows. This is due to the fact that a higher domestic interest rate becomes attractive to 
international investors. This puts upward pressure on the exchange rate. The authorities have to 
act on this: the central bank will have to respond by increasing its foreign exchange reserves to 
bring the interest rate down to its original level. It is against this background that when the 
exchange rate is fixed or heavily managed, the effectiveness of monetary policy is reduced but 
not necessarily entirely eliminated. The authorities still have some room for manoeuvring. 
Despite the fact that monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate has come under heavy debate, 
there is an understanding that there are two ways in which monetary policy can maintain a degree 
of independence with the exchange rate channel present in the case of a fixed exchange rate 
regime. In particular, the exchange rate might not be completely fixed but may vary slightly and 
secondly, monetary policy can influence the real exchange rate by working through the price 
level. An exchange rate system that allows some fluctuation within a target zone, accompanied 
by some capital controls and a system where domestic and foreign assets are imperfect 
substitutes, may give the central bank some scope for domestic interest rates to deviate from the 
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INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy conduct in Namibia incorporated the practice of fixed exchange rate regimes 
whereby the exchange rate is the main policy instrument used to control inflation in order to 
maintain financial stability. This has been the practice since 1990 at the time of independence, 
when Namibia remained in the CMA. Subsequent to joining the CMA, a separate bilateral 
agreement between Namibia and South Africa (SA) on features of the peg was set in 1992, in 
anticipation of the one-to-one peg of the Namibian dollar to the SA rand, formally instituted in 
1993 after the introduction of the Namibian currency. This is in line with the requirement which 
demands the need to fulfil the backing rules. The rand remains legal tender in Namibia (Kalenga, 
2001: 3).  
As a member of a CMA, Namibia does not engage in any active discretionary monetary policy 
because it is primarily subordinated to SA’s monetary policy conduct. Hence, economic agents’ 
expectations are heavily dependent on the movements of the nominal exchange rate. That is, 
under this arrangement maintenance of the exchange rate peg as an intermediate target ensures 
the ultimate goal of price stability by importing stable inflation from SA, the anchor country 
(Kalenga, 2001:4). 
Developments of the SA rand have both direct and indirect impact on the Namibia dollar, 
particularly via imported goods, especially given the fact that SA is Namibia’s main trading 
partner. Records show that about 80 per cent of Namibia’s trade is with SA and it is expected that 
imports from South Africa play a significant role in determining inflation in Namibia. Economic 
theory states that under a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy can affect the real 
exchange rate through prices while holding the nominal exchange rate fixed. There is no study 
that has empirically examined this channel in Namibia. Therefore, the objective of this study is to 
examine the effects of the impact of the developments in SA rand in the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy in Namibia, in particular the exchange rate channel. In 
investigating this channel of transmission the paper is divided into five sections. Section two 
presents the theoretical and empirical literature review on this channel. The methodology adopted 
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(2004) for Singapore. This study uses the real effective exchange rate as a measure for monetary 
policy and finds that output reacts immediately and significantly to a contractionary monetary 
policy shock. The study finds that the exchange rate channel was more effective in transmitting 
monetary policy to the economy than the interest rate channel was.
In Armenia, Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier’s (2006) study examined monetary policy 
transmission in the context of the authorities’ intention to shift to an inflation-targeting regime 
over the medium term. In this study monthly data for 2000: 5 to 2005: 12 were used. The 
Granger causality tests and a VAR model were used for analysis. The results from this study 
indicated that the capability of monetary policy to influence economic activity and inflation was 
still limited, as important channels of monetary transmission were not fully functional. In 
particular, the interest rate channel remained weak, even though there was some evidence of 
transmission to prices of changes in the repo rate under the central bank’s new operating target 
for inflation. As in other emerging and transition economies with a high degree of dollarisation, 
the exchange rate channel had a strong impact on the inflation rate. The study also showed that 
inflation responded to broad money shocks, once foreign currency deposits were included.
In Vietnam, Hung (2007) analysed the monetary transmission mechanism in Vietnam, using 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted data from 1996Q1 to 2005Q4. In this study the techniques such as
VAR, impulse response function, the Granger causality test and variance decomposition were 
used to analyse the effect of monetary shocks on output. In particular, the focus was on the 
reduced-form relationships between money, real output, price level, real interest rate, real 
exchange rate and credit. The results of this study revealed that monetary policy can affect output 
and price level. While examining the specific channels, namely the interest rate, the credit 
channel and the exchange rate channel, the results showed that the significance of each channel 
was weak. However, the credit and exchange rate channels appeared to be the most significant 
channels.
In Egypt, Al-Mashat and Billmeier’s (2007) study examined the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Egypt in the context of the central bank’s intention to shift to inflation targeting. 
The study used monthly observations running from January 1996 to June 2005. A VAR model 
was used to evaluate the different channels. The results revealed that exchange rate channel 
played a strong role in propagating monetary shocks to output and prices. Most other channels 
(bank lending, asset price) were rather weak. The interest rate channel was found to be 
underdeveloped but appeared to be strengthening after the introduction of the interest corridor in 
2005, boding well for adopting inflation targeting over the medium term.
Additional empirical studies on the exchange rate channel include Zengin (2000) in Turkey 
where exchange rate was ineffective in monetary policy transmission; Sezer (2002) in Turkey 
where exchange rate was found to be effective; Citu (2003) in New Zealand where exchange rate 
was effective in the transmission of the dynamic effect of monetary policy in smaller developed 
countries but not in the big developed countries; Hwee (2004) in Singapore where exchange rate 
was found to be effective in transmitting monetary policy to the economy; Ramglon (2004) in the 
Carribean where exchange rate has been operational but not so significantly; Al-Mashat and 
Billmeier (2007) in Egypt where exchange rate channel plays a strong role in propagating 
monetary shocks to output and prices; Samkharadze (2008) in Georgia where exchange rate is 
effective particularly in determining inflation, and Ornek (2009) in Turkey where exchange rate 
channel is effective.
levels set by the interest rate parities. This is true for as long as the exchange rate does not reach 
the zone’s boundaries, since when this happens maintaining [the boundaries] in the face of 
speculative pressure presents all the problems of a fixed exchange rate. However, if domestic and 
foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, domestic interest rates may deviate from international 
levels. In this way, monetary policy can affect the real exchange rate through prices while 
holding the nominal exchange rate fixed. Furthermore, via this channel the monetary authorities 
can affect net exports at a limited degree but with much longer lags. Therefore, capital controls 
and imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, along with a target zone regime, 
create a channel for monetary policy to affect output and prices despite a fixed exchange rate 
system (Bitans, Stikuts & Tillers, 2003).
The importance of evaluating the exchange rate channel is a result of suggestions that have been 
made on escaping from a liquidity trap. In particular these suggestions focus on the exchange rate 
as a tool. The most popular suggestion is that of Svensson (2001, 2003), whose proposal consists 
of three elements: Firstly, the central bank should announce an upward-sloping target path. 
Secondly, a currency devaluation is announced, together with a currency peg to a crawling 
exchange rate target. This would imply that the monetary authorities commit to buying and 
selling unlimited amounts of foreign exchange at the exchange rate. Furthermore, the initial level 
of exchange rate target after the devaluation is chosen with the aim of ensuring a real 
depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state. Because of the assumption of 
the domestic price level being sticky, in the short run the real exchange rate moves one-to-one 
with the nominal exchange rate. However, the exchange rate target corresponds to a nominal 
depreciation of the domestic currency at the rate of difference between the domestic inflation 
target and foreign inflation. The appreciation of the exchange rate in nominal terms takes place 
when domestic inflation is lower than foreign inflation, especially when the peg is fixed instead 
of crawling. Thirdly, an exit strategy is confidently declared when the price level target path has 
been reached. This is to say, the currency peg will be abandoned in favour of flexible price level 
targeting (Mehrotra, 2006: 141).
Empirical literature
Below is a discussion on empirical studies on this channel. A study by Bitans, Stikuts and Tillers 
(2003) examined the transmission of monetary shocks in Latvia. It dealt in particular with short-
term reactions of the economy to various monetary shocks. Monthly data for the period January 
1995 to March 2002 were used. The importance of various channels of monetary transmission 
was tested empirically by using the SVAR model and small structural macroeconomic model. 
The analysis provided evidence that monetary shocks were transmitted to the economy mainly 
through the exchange rate channel. The analysis of the financial system of Latvia supported the 
view that the wealth channel was very weak or even non-existent at the time because of a 
relatively underdeveloped capital market. 
A study by Muco, Sanfey and Taci (2003) examined the conduct of monetary policy in Albania 
during the transition period. This study used monthly data for the period January 1994 to May 
2003. By employing the VAR model, the study identified various channels through which 
monetary policy could affect prices and output and established their relative importance. 
Estimates from a VAR model of key macroeconomic variables demonstrated the weak link 
between money supply and inflation up to mid-2000. However, the move during 2000 from 
direct to indirect instruments of monetary control helped to strengthen the predictability of the 
transmission link from money supply to inflation. Hence the conclusion that external influence, 
by contributing to exchange rate stability, had played an important part in keeping inflation low 
for most of the transition period. Moreover, the introduction of indirect instruments of monetary 
policy appeared to have contributed to the effectiveness of the exchange rate transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy into the real economy. These results concur with those of Hwee 
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are applied. Usually, the ADF statistic tests the null hypothesis of the existence of unit roots
against the alternative hypothesis of non-existence of unit roots (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1991; 
Gujarati, 1995; 2003). Thereafter, a Granger causality test is performed. 
VAR can be considered as means of conducting causality tests, or more specifically Granger 
causality tests. Granger causality test is considered a useful technique for determining whether 
one time series is good for forecasting the other. Granger causality really implies a correlation 
between the current value of one variable and the past values of others; it does not mean changes 
in one variable cause changes in another. If there are two series Yt & Xt, then it is said that Xt
does not Granger cause Yt if all lagged coefficients for Xt are zero, that is:   
tptp1t1ptp1t10t X...XY...YY ε+β++β+α+α+α= −−−− …(7)
Then β1 = β2 = … = βp = 0, that is lagged of Xt has no effect on Yt. It is possible to have 
causality running from variable X to Y, but not Y to X; from Y to X, but not X to Y and from 
both Y to X and X to Y, although in this case interpretation of the relationship is difficult. The 
Granger causality test can also be used as a test for whether a variable is exogenous. That is, if no 
variables in a model affect a particular variable it can be viewed as exogenous. To determine 
which variable causes the other, pair-wise Granger causality tests are used. But since this test is 
affected by the number of lags, before running this test it is necessary to determine the number of 
lags. There are many criteria used to indicate the number of lags. These criteria are Hannan-
Quinn (HQ), Schwarz information criterion (SC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), final 
prediction error (FPE) and likelihood ratio (LR). After determining the number of lags it is 
possible to run a pair-wise Granger causality test so long VAR satisfies the stability condition.
The next step would be to conduct tests for co-integration, that is if two or more series have long-
run equilibrium. The econometric literature deals with the cointegration subject from several 
perspectives. The cointegration test can be applied in several ways, according to the nature of the 
equation that is tested. If it is a single one the Engle-Granger method is used; if it is a 
multivariate system the Johansen approach is applied to determine the existence of the long-run 
relationship among variables. The Johansen procedure uses two tests to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors: the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. Trace statistics investigate 
the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of n cointegrating relations, 
where n is the number of variables in the system for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. Its equation is computed 








itr TnrLR l …(8)
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the 
alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. This test’s statistics are computed 
as:
)ˆ1log(*)1/(max l−−=+ TnrLR …(9)
Where λi is the maximum eigenvalue, and T is the sample size. 
In cases where trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics may yield different results, the results of 
the trace test are preferred. Prior to applying the Johansen test, the number of lags must be 
determined as suggested by the five criteria: the sequential likelihood ratio (LR), Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), final prediction error (FPE) and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). If cointegration is found among the variables, the 
adjustment of the short-run to the long-run equilibrium is obtained through the vector error 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Econometric framework and model specification
Most empirical studies have predominantly used the structural VAR approach in analysing 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model 
is a structural-form relationship deduced from the reduced-form VAR. These restrictions can be 
either contemporaneous or long-run restrictions, depending on whether economic theory suggests 
the shocks are either temporary or permanent in nature (McCoy, 1997: 7). Therefore it can be 
said that a VAR is the reduced form of a general dynamic structural model. The relationship 
between a reduced-form VAR and SVAR is presented below. Equation 1 below represents a 
dynamic structural model. The reparameterisation of Equation 1 leads to a reduced-form 
relationship represented by Equation 2.
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where  Yt is a  (n × 1)  vector of endogenous variables and B(L) denotes a polynomial in the 
lag operator.  Γ and  B are parameters.  et is the residual of the model.  
It can be inferred from the Equations 1 and 2 that 





Equation 4 is the core representation of the SVAR model whereby the reduced-form disturbance 
μ is related to the underlying structural shocks. et The identification of Γ and B are required to 
obtain the structural parameter B*. This paper uses the four-variable VAR. The vector of 
endogenous variables of the exchange rate model includes:
[ ]RXRCPGYY ttt ,' ∆∆= … (5)
with tGY∆ denoting output growth, tCP∆ the rate of inflation; XR is the exchange rate and 
R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from the estimated 





































































































The estimation procedure is done in this sequence. The initial step is to test for non-stationary 
(unit root) of time series in order to establish the univariate characteristics of data and the order 
of integration. To investigate the non-stationarity of the series the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test, the Phillips-Perrons (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests 
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are applied. Usually, the ADF statistic tests the null hypothesis of the existence of unit roots
against the alternative hypothesis of non-existence of unit roots (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1991; 
Gujarati, 1995; 2003). Thereafter, a Granger causality test is performed. 
VAR can be considered as means of conducting causality tests, or more specifically Granger 
causality tests. Granger causality test is considered a useful technique for determining whether 
one time series is good for forecasting the other. Granger causality really implies a correlation 
between the current value of one variable and the past values of others; it does not mean changes 
in one variable cause changes in another. If there are two series Yt & Xt, then it is said that Xt
does not Granger cause Yt if all lagged coefficients for Xt are zero, that is:   
tptp1t1ptp1t10t X...XY...YY ε+β++β+α+α+α= −−−− …(7)
Then β1 = β2 = … = βp = 0, that is lagged of Xt has no effect on Yt. It is possible to have 
causality running from variable X to Y, but not Y to X; from Y to X, but not X to Y and from 
both Y to X and X to Y, although in this case interpretation of the relationship is difficult. The 
Granger causality test can also be used as a test for whether a variable is exogenous. That is, if no 
variables in a model affect a particular variable it can be viewed as exogenous. To determine 
which variable causes the other, pair-wise Granger causality tests are used. But since this test is 
affected by the number of lags, before running this test it is necessary to determine the number of 
lags. There are many criteria used to indicate the number of lags. These criteria are Hannan-
Quinn (HQ), Schwarz information criterion (SC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), final 
prediction error (FPE) and likelihood ratio (LR). After determining the number of lags it is 
possible to run a pair-wise Granger causality test so long VAR satisfies the stability condition.
The next step would be to conduct tests for co-integration, that is if two or more series have long-
run equilibrium. The econometric literature deals with the cointegration subject from several 
perspectives. The cointegration test can be applied in several ways, according to the nature of the 
equation that is tested. If it is a single one the Engle-Granger method is used; if it is a 
multivariate system the Johansen approach is applied to determine the existence of the long-run 
relationship among variables. The Johansen procedure uses two tests to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors: the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test. Trace statistics investigate 
the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of n cointegrating relations, 
where n is the number of variables in the system for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. Its equation is computed 








itr TnrLR l …(8)
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the 
alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations for r = 0, 1, 2…n-1. This test’s statistics are computed 
as:
)ˆ1log(*)1/(max l−−=+ TnrLR …(9)
Where λi is the maximum eigenvalue, and T is the sample size. 
In cases where trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics may yield different results, the results of 
the trace test are preferred. Prior to applying the Johansen test, the number of lags must be 
determined as suggested by the five criteria: the sequential likelihood ratio (LR), Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), final prediction error (FPE) and 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). If cointegration is found among the variables, the 
adjustment of the short-run to the long-run equilibrium is obtained through the vector error 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Econometric framework and model specification
Most empirical studies have predominantly used the structural VAR approach in analysing 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model 
is a structural-form relationship deduced from the reduced-form VAR. These restrictions can be 
either contemporaneous or long-run restrictions, depending on whether economic theory suggests 
the shocks are either temporary or permanent in nature (McCoy, 1997: 7). Therefore it can be 
said that a VAR is the reduced form of a general dynamic structural model. The relationship 
between a reduced-form VAR and SVAR is presented below. Equation 1 below represents a 
dynamic structural model. The reparameterisation of Equation 1 leads to a reduced-form 
relationship represented by Equation 2.






−− Γ+Γ= or  tt
*
t Y)L(BY µ+= … (2)
where  Yt is a  (n × 1)  vector of endogenous variables and B(L) denotes a polynomial in the 
lag operator.  Γ and  B are parameters.  et is the residual of the model.  
It can be inferred from the Equations 1 and 2 that 





Equation 4 is the core representation of the SVAR model whereby the reduced-form disturbance 
μ is related to the underlying structural shocks. et The identification of Γ and B are required to 
obtain the structural parameter B*. This paper uses the four-variable VAR. The vector of 
endogenous variables of the exchange rate model includes:
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with tGY∆ denoting output growth, tCP∆ the rate of inflation; XR is the exchange rate and 
R is the repo rate. The equation separating structural economic shocks from the estimated 





































































































The estimation procedure is done in this sequence. The initial step is to test for non-stationary 
(unit root) of time series in order to establish the univariate characteristics of data and the order 
of integration. To investigate the non-stationarity of the series the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test, the Phillips-Perrons (PP) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests 
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Notes:(a)at 5% the critical value -2.908 for lnGY, -2.906 for lnCP, -2.906 for R and -2.908 for
lnXR. (b)** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%  
In general, the ADF and PP tests have very low power against I(0) alternatives that are close to 
being I(1) such that they cannot distinguish highly persistent stationary processes from non-
stationary processes very well. Furthermore, tests that include a constant and trend in the test 
regression have less power than tests that only include a constant in the test regression. To 
overcome the lack of success of the common unit root tests, the KPSS test is also used as a 
confirmatory test because it is believed to be more efficient and have higher power than the ADF 
and PP tests. Table 2 below presents the results of the KPSS test that confirm the results of the 
earlier tests (the ADF and PP) and that the series is integrated of order one I(1). 









Intercept and trend 0.86 0.07** 1
Intercept 0.87 0.07** 1
lnXRt
Intercept and trend 0.23** 0.05** 1
Intercept 0.62 0.16** 1
lnGYt
Intercept and trend 0.35** 0.11** 1
Intercept 1.07 0.099 1
lnCPt
Intercept and trend 0.216** 0.04** 1
Intercept 0.74 0.05** 1
Source: Author’s compilation and values obtained from Eviews
Notes: (a) at 5% the critical value 0.463 for all the variables.(b)* implies rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 5%. 
Having established the univariate characteristics of the variables, the reduced form VAR model is 
estimated. The information criteria for the lag order selection for the VAR system is presented in 
Table 3. These tests show the convergence on the lag length and that is the essence of the lag 
structure test. At the chosen lag length, all the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial 
have a modulus of less than one and lie inside the unit circle, indicating that the estimated VAR 
is stable or satisfies the stability condition as shown in Table 4.
Table 3: Lag length criteria for the exchange rate channel
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -177.5706 NA 0.002269 5.262917 5.392431 5.314299
1 91.03119 498.2759 1.50e-06 -2.058875 -1.411308* -1.801964*
2 111.1730 35.02920 1.34e-06 -2.178927 -1.013306 -1.716486
3 122.8667 18.98117 1.53e-06 -2.054108 -0.370434 -1.386139
4 145.4189 33.99165 1.30e-06 -2.244026 -0.042298 -1.370527
5 160.3111 20.71953 1.39e-06 -2.211915 0.507867 -1.132886
6 171.7622 14.60432 1.69e-06 -2.080063 1.157773 -0.795506
7 212.4317 47.15303* 8.97e-07* -2.795121* 0.960768 -1.305034
Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews.
correction model (VECM) and if no cointegration is found, then a VAR model specification is 
estimated. However, the structural factorisation is estimated first and this procedure is used to 
estimate the factorisation matrices for a structural (or identified) VAR, whether from VAR or 
VECM the impulse response function (IRF), and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) 
are derived. IRF traces the response of the endogenous variables to one standard deviation shock 
or change to one of the disturbance terms in the system. A shock to a variable is transmitted to all 
of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the VAR. FEVD examines the 
effects of shocks to the dependent variables. It determines how much of the forecast error 
variance for any variable in a system is explained by innovations to each explanatory variable
over a series of time horizons. 
DATA AND DATA SOURCES
This study utilised quarterly time-series data for the period 1993Q1-2011Q4. The data is obtained 
from various sources, namely National Accounts (Republic of Namibia), the Bank of Namibia’s 
Quarterly and Annual Report as well as from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics. The data for the following variables were obtained, namely output, general 
prices, real effective exchange rate and interest rate. All data has been transformed into natural 
logarithms.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Unit root test
The first step before estimation is to establish univariate characteristics of the data to determine 
whether the variables are stationary. The problem with non-stationary or trended data is that the 
standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression procedures can easily lead to incorrect 
conclusions. This study uses the ADF, PP and KPSS tests. This is because some tests address the 
weaknesses associated with others. The results of the unit root test for all the variables in levels 
are presented in Table 1. The series were found to be non-stationary in level form except for the 
repo rate where the two tests (ADF and PP) are in contradiction. The series were differenced 
once and all of them became stationary at all levels of significance. Hence, they are integrated of 
order one. 






























Intercept -2.75 -1.98 -5.92** -5.87** 1
Source: Author’s compilation and values obtained from Eviews
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Notes:(a)at 5% the critical value -2.908 for lnGY, -2.906 for lnCP, -2.906 for R and -2.908 for
lnXR. (b)** means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%  
In general, the ADF and PP tests have very low power against I(0) alternatives that are close to 
being I(1) such that they cannot distinguish highly persistent stationary processes from non-
stationary processes very well. Furthermore, tests that include a constant and trend in the test 
regression have less power than tests that only include a constant in the test regression. To 
overcome the lack of success of the common unit root tests, the KPSS test is also used as a 
confirmatory test because it is believed to be more efficient and have higher power than the ADF 
and PP tests. Table 2 below presents the results of the KPSS test that confirm the results of the 
earlier tests (the ADF and PP) and that the series is integrated of order one I(1). 
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Notes: (a) at 5% the critical value 0.463 for all the variables.(b)* implies rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 5%. 
Having established the univariate characteristics of the variables, the reduced form VAR model is 
estimated. The information criteria for the lag order selection for the VAR system is presented in 
Table 3. These tests show the convergence on the lag length and that is the essence of the lag 
structure test. At the chosen lag length, all the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial 
have a modulus of less than one and lie inside the unit circle, indicating that the estimated VAR 
is stable or satisfies the stability condition as shown in Table 4.
Table 3: Lag length criteria for the exchange rate channel
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -177.5706 NA 0.002269 5.262917 5.392431 5.314299
1 91.03119 498.2759 1.50e-06 -2.058875 -1.411308* -1.801964*
2 111.1730 35.02920 1.34e-06 -2.178927 -1.013306 -1.716486
3 122.8667 18.98117 1.53e-06 -2.054108 -0.370434 -1.386139
4 145.4189 33.99165 1.30e-06 -2.244026 -0.042298 -1.370527
5 160.3111 20.71953 1.39e-06 -2.211915 0.507867 -1.132886
6 171.7622 14.60432 1.69e-06 -2.080063 1.157773 -0.795506
7 212.4317 47.15303* 8.97e-07* -2.795121* 0.960768 -1.305034
Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews.
correction model (VECM) and if no cointegration is found, then a VAR model specification is 
estimated. However, the structural factorisation is estimated first and this procedure is used to 
estimate the factorisation matrices for a structural (or identified) VAR, whether from VAR or 
VECM the impulse response function (IRF), and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) 
are derived. IRF traces the response of the endogenous variables to one standard deviation shock 
or change to one of the disturbance terms in the system. A shock to a variable is transmitted to all 
of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the VAR. FEVD examines the 
effects of shocks to the dependent variables. It determines how much of the forecast error 
variance for any variable in a system is explained by innovations to each explanatory variable
over a series of time horizons. 
DATA AND DATA SOURCES
This study utilised quarterly time-series data for the period 1993Q1-2011Q4. The data is obtained 
from various sources, namely National Accounts (Republic of Namibia), the Bank of Namibia’s 
Quarterly and Annual Report as well as from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics. The data for the following variables were obtained, namely output, general 
prices, real effective exchange rate and interest rate. All data has been transformed into natural 
logarithms.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Unit root test
The first step before estimation is to establish univariate characteristics of the data to determine 
whether the variables are stationary. The problem with non-stationary or trended data is that the 
standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression procedures can easily lead to incorrect 
conclusions. This study uses the ADF, PP and KPSS tests. This is because some tests address the 
weaknesses associated with others. The results of the unit root test for all the variables in levels 
are presented in Table 1. The series were found to be non-stationary in level form except for the 
repo rate where the two tests (ADF and PP) are in contradiction. The series were differenced 
once and all of them became stationary at all levels of significance. Hence, they are integrated of 
order one. 






























Intercept -2.75 -1.98 -5.92** -5.87** 1
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Table 6: Granger causality tests for the exchange rate channel 
Dependent Variable in Regression





















Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews.
Notes: (a) GY denotes output, CP denotes rate of price inflation, XR denotes real effective 
exchange rate and R denotes repo rate. (b) ** means a rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%.
Impulse response functions
Figure 1 below presents the impulse responses of output and consumer prices to innovation in the 
repo rate. The response of output to monetary tightening is in line with economic theory. Repo 
rate shocks have transitory output effects that die out very quickly; the same can also be said 
about the response of consumer prices to monetary tightening. The figure shows transitory price 
effects that die out on the short term. The exchange rate appreciated after an increase in the repo 
rate. The deviation of the responses is very minor and remains close to the steady line, meaning 
they are close to the baseline. This leaves a grey area in terms of whether the exchange rate is 
functional in Namibia. This is no surprise in view of the fact the existence of capital controls and 
the rigid exchange rate regime in Namibia. 
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0.684483 - 0.212173i 0.716613




Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews.
Note: No roots lie outside the unit circle. VAR satisfies the stability condition
Cointegration Test
If two or more series are non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is stationary, then the 
series are said to be cointegrated. The concept of cointegration mimics the existence of a long-
run equilibrium to which an economic system converges over time, and μt defined above can be 
interpreted as the disequilibrium error. This study uses the Johansen-Juselius (1990) method to
test for cointegration. The results for cointegration are presented in table 5. The results shows 
that both trace and maximum eigen values test statistic indicate no cointegrating equations. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected because the test statistics are less than 
the critical values.
Table 5: Johansen cointegration test based on trace and maximum eigen values of the 
stochastic matrix for the exchange rate channel















r = 0 r =1 11.56 27.58 r = 0 r >=1 27.68 47.86
r <=1 r = 2 9.37 21.13 r <= 1 r >= 2 16.12 29.80
r <=2 r = 3 6.70 14.26 r <= 2 r >= 3 6.75 15.49
r <=3 r = 4 0.05 3.84 r <= 3 r >= 4 0.05 3.84
Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews. 
Note: Trace and max-eigenvalue tests indicate no cointegrating equations at the 0.05 level. 
Sample period 1993:Q1 to 2011:Q4. 
Granger Causality Test
Table 6 below summarises the Granger causality results for the four-variable VAR. The results 
show that output can help to predict the repo rate and all other variables do not help to predict 
one another. Hence, there is no causality among the rest of the variables. 
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Table 6: Granger causality tests for the exchange rate channel 
Dependent Variable in Regression
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Granger Causality Test
Table 6 below summarises the Granger causality results for the four-variable VAR. The results 
show that output can help to predict the repo rate and all other variables do not help to predict 
one another. Hence, there is no causality among the rest of the variables. 
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The table also shows that fluctuations in the exchange rate are largely attributed to the repo rate, 
accounting for 6.3 per cent after eight quarters, 10.2 per cent after 12 quarters and 11.3 per cent 
after 16 quarters. The variations in the repo rate are dominated by the output, accounting for 10.9 
per cent after 12 quarters and 16.1 per cent after 16 quarters. The second variable that accounts 
for fluctuations in the repo rate is the exchange rate, accounting for 8 per cent and 10.2 per cent 
after 12 and 16 quarters respectively. The relationship between output and the repo rate 
accounting for variations among them is not surprising, as it is evident from the result of the 
Granger causality and impulse responses. However, notably, the exchange rate accounts for 
fluctuations in almost all the other variables. This implies that inclusion of the exchange rate 
provides important additional information to the monetary transmission process
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a review on the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission in 
affecting prices and output. Economic theory states that under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
monetary policy can affect the real exchange rate through prices while holding the nominal 
exchange rate fixed. The study used quarterly data and covered a period of 1993 to 2011. The 
empirical analysis conducted makes use the SVAR methodology. The results on the exchange 
rate channel demonstrate that response of output to monetary tightening is in line with economic 
theory. The same can also be said about the response of consumer prices to monetary tightening. 
The exchange rate appreciated after an increase in the repo rate but only relatively. This leaves a 
grey area in terms of whether the exchange rate is functional in the Namibian case. This is no 
surprise in view of existing capital controls and the rigid exchange rate regime of Namibia. 
Overall, there is evidence that the exchange rate channel has operated as a monetary policy 
transmission in Namibia. However, the effect is not particularly weak and not so significant,
since Namibia practises a pegged exchange rate and capital controls. These results conform to
other international studies that found that the exchange rate is functional but not significantly so.
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Forecast error variance decomposition
Table 7 presents forecast error variance decompositions for each variable in the model over a 16-
quarter forecast horizon. The result shows that fluctuations in the output are mostly attributed to 
the exchange rate, reported to account for 6.6 per cent after eight quarters, 9.6 per cent after 12 
quarters and 12.1 per cent after 16 quarters. The repo rate also accounts for fluctuations in the 
output but not as much as the exchange rate. It accounts for 4.4 after 12 quarters and 4.4 after 16 
quarters. The variations in the consumer prices are also mostly dominated by the exchange rate, 
which accounts for 2.7 per cent after 12 quarters and 3.3 per cent after 16 quarters. The repo rate 
is the second variable that accounts for variations in consumer prices, but with relatively lower 
fluctuations compared to the exchange rate. 
Table 7: Variance decomposition for the exchange rate channel 
Variance Decomposition of GY
Quarter GY CP XR R
1 100 0 0 0
4 95.300 0.032 3.532 1.133
8 89.570 0.124 6.576 3.730
12 85.773 0.230 9.595 4.402
16 83.352 0.298 12.147 4.204
Variance decomposition of CP
Quarter GY CP XR R
1 0.112 99.888 0 0
4 0.166 97.299 0.439 2.097
8 0.340 95.622 1.670 2.368
12 0.817 93.976 2.691 2.516
16 1.225 92.894 3.263 2.618
Variance decomposition of XR
Quarter GY CP XR R
1 0.316 0.120 99.564 0
4 0.276 0.061 99.063 0.600
8 1.003 0.069 92.620 6.308
12 1.603 0.117 88.125 10.156
16 1.906 0.169 86.621 11.304
Variance decomposition of R
Quarter GY CP XR R
1 0.437 5.776 0.228 93.558
4 0.501 3.295 0.980 95.224
8 4.184 2.595 4.536 88.685
12 10.852 2.424 7.993 76.672
16 16.072 2.251 10.167 71.511
Source: Author’s compilation using Eviews.
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The table also shows that fluctuations in the exchange rate are largely attributed to the repo rate, 
accounting for 6.3 per cent after eight quarters, 10.2 per cent after 12 quarters and 11.3 per cent 
after 16 quarters. The variations in the repo rate are dominated by the output, accounting for 10.9 
per cent after 12 quarters and 16.1 per cent after 16 quarters. The second variable that accounts 
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grey area in terms of whether the exchange rate is functional in the Namibian case. This is no 
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Overall, there is evidence that the exchange rate channel has operated as a monetary policy 
transmission in Namibia. However, the effect is not particularly weak and not so significant,
since Namibia practises a pegged exchange rate and capital controls. These results conform to
other international studies that found that the exchange rate is functional but not significantly so.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the possibility of developing Francistown as one of the Botswana’s tourism 
destinations. The focus is developmental initiatives that can transform Francistown from an
ordinary transit city into a stopover where tourists can spend a few days. It would then be a city 
similar to Kasane and Maun which are the key tourism destinations in Botswana, also attracting 
visitors from the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa.
Francistown is located in the north-eastern part of the country. This part of Botswana as a whole 
attracts comparatively few international visitors. Francistown has the potential to become one of 
the key tourism destinations in Botswana. A number of people living in Francistown and 
surrounding areas are said to be living in poverty emanating from high unemployment. Tourism 
has the potential to create employment and subsequently eradicate poverty.
Keywords: Economic diversification; urban tourism; poverty alleviation and tourism 
development.
INTRODUCTION
The Botswana tourism product is mainly nature-based and predominantly dominant in the 
northernmost part of the country, particularly in the Chobe and Okavango regions. In this regard, 
there is little focus on the development of urban tourism in the country. The Okavango Delta and 
the Chobe National Park are the key tourism attractions in Botswana. There is an over- emphasis 
on ecotourism in Botswana, and this means that measures need to be taken to diversify the 
country’s tourism product so that the contribution of tourism to the country’s economy can be 
enhanced. This research therefore aims to sensitise tourism leaders and city leaders in Botswana 
to develop and promote urban tourism so as to diversify the country’s tourism offering. In 
particular, the research proposes that such developments and promotion should be in Francistown
as well as any other suitable location. Francistown is the second largest city in Botswana and is a 
transit city for travellers to Kasane, Gaborone, Maun, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia and 
Namibia.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Brief Geography of Botswana
Botswana is a landlocked country lying at the centre of the Southern African plateau (Botswana 
Population Census, 2001). Four countries border Botswana: Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Botswana and Francistown in particular is a transit location for truck drivers from 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. With a population of approximately two million 
and a total area of 582 000 square kilometres, Botswana is a sparsely populated country
(Botswana Population Census, 2001). Large parts of the country are sparsely inhabited owing to 
the Kgalagadi (Kalahari) desert occupying 87 per cent of the land. Most of the population live in 
the eastern part of the country, including Francistown, which is closer to Zimbabwean border.
Botswana is rich in diamonds and tourism and these form key components in the rapid economic 
1Dr L.S. Ketshabile, Botswana Accountancy College, Gaborone, Botswana. 
                                                          
Gujarati, D.N. 1995. Basic econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hung, L.V. 2007. A vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of the monetary transmission
mechanism in Vietnam. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan.
Hwee, C. 2004. A VAR analysis of Singapore’s monetary transmission mechanism. SMU 
Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series. Singapore: Singapore Management University, 
September 2004.
Johansen, S. & Juselius, K. 1990. Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on 
cointergration. With applications to the demand for money. University of Oxford Journal. 52(2):
169-210.
Kalenga, P. 2001. Monetary policy framework in Namibia. Occasional Paper, Bank of Namibia. 
Karamanou, P., Mahadeva, L., Robinson, P. & Syrichas, G. (n.d.) Monetary transmission 
mechanism in Cyprus: a fixed exchange rate case. Available online at: www.google.com.
[Accessed 18 August 2010].
McCoy, D. 1997. How useful is structural VAR analysis for Irish economics? CBI Technical 
Paper, 2/RT/9
Mehrotra, A. 2006. Essays on empirical macroeconomics. Bank of England.
Muco, M., Sanfey, P. & Taci, A. 2003. Inflation, exchange rates and the role of monetary policy
in Albania. Fourth International Conference on Albanian Economy, Performance and Policy 
Challenges, September 11-12, 2003 in Saranda, Albania.
Örnek, T. 2009. The operation of monetary transmission mechanism channels in Turkey. Finance 
Journal 156: 104-125.
Pindyck, R.S. & Rubinfield, D.L. 1991. Econometric models & economic forecasts. McGraw-
Hill, Inc. International Editions.
Ramlogan, C. 2004. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Evidence from the 
Caribbean. Journal of Economic Studies, 31(5): 435-447.
Ramos-Francia, M. & Sidaoui, J.J. 2008. The monetary transmission mechanism in Mexico:
recent developments. BIS Papers No 35.
Samkharadze, B. 2008. Monetary transmission mechanism in Georgia: analyzing pass-through
of different channels. Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Belgium.
Sezer, B. 2003. Monetary transmission mechanism and its operation in Turkey. MBA Thesis, 
Ankara University Social Sciences Institute., Turkey.
Svensson, L.E.O. 2001. The zero bound in an open economy: a foolproof way of escaping from a 
liquidity trap. Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies 19: 277-312.
Zengin, A. 2000. The movements of real exchange rate and foreign trade prices empirical 
evidence on Turkey’s economy. Journal of C.U. Faculty of Economics and Administrative 
Sciences, 2: 27-41.
Journal for Development and Leadership 27
DIVERSIFICATION OF THE BOTSWANA TOURISM 
PRODUCT THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN 
TOURISM STRATEGY – THE CASE OF FRANCISTOWN
L.S. Ketshabile1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the possibility of developing Francistown as one of the Botswana’s tourism 
destinations. The focus is developmental initiatives that can transform Francistown from an
ordinary transit city into a stopover where tourists can spend a few days. It would then be a city 
similar to Kasane and Maun which are the key tourism destinations in Botswana, also attracting 
visitors from the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and South Africa.
Francistown is located in the north-eastern part of the country. This part of Botswana as a whole 
attracts comparatively few international visitors. Francistown has the potential to become one of 
the key tourism destinations in Botswana. A number of people living in Francistown and 
surrounding areas are said to be living in poverty emanating from high unemployment. Tourism 
has the potential to create employment and subsequently eradicate poverty.
Keywords: Economic diversification; urban tourism; poverty alleviation and tourism 
development.
INTRODUCTION
The Botswana tourism product is mainly nature-based and predominantly dominant in the 
northernmost part of the country, particularly in the Chobe and Okavango regions. In this regard, 
there is little focus on the development of urban tourism in the country. The Okavango Delta and 
the Chobe National Park are the key tourism attractions in Botswana. There is an over- emphasis 
on ecotourism in Botswana, and this means that measures need to be taken to diversify the 
country’s tourism product so that the contribution of tourism to the country’s economy can be 
enhanced. This research therefore aims to sensitise tourism leaders and city leaders in Botswana 
to develop and promote urban tourism so as to diversify the country’s tourism offering. In 
particular, the research proposes that such developments and promotion should be in Francistown
as well as any other suitable location. Francistown is the second largest city in Botswana and is a 
transit city for travellers to Kasane, Gaborone, Maun, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia and 
Namibia.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Brief Geography of Botswana
Botswana is a landlocked country lying at the centre of the Southern African plateau (Botswana 
Population Census, 2001). Four countries border Botswana: Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Botswana and Francistown in particular is a transit location for truck drivers from 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. With a population of approximately two million 
and a total area of 582 000 square kilometres, Botswana is a sparsely populated country
(Botswana Population Census, 2001). Large parts of the country are sparsely inhabited owing to 
the Kgalagadi (Kalahari) desert occupying 87 per cent of the land. Most of the population live in 
the eastern part of the country, including Francistown, which is closer to Zimbabwean border.
Botswana is rich in diamonds and tourism and these form key components in the rapid economic 
1Dr L.S. Ketshabile, Botswana Accountancy College, Gaborone, Botswana. 
                                                          
Gujarati, D.N. 1995. Basic econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hung, L.V. 2007. A vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of the monetary transmission
mechanism in Vietnam. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan.
Hwee, C. 2004. A VAR analysis of Singapore’s monetary transmission mechanism. SMU 
Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series. Singapore: Singapore Management University, 
September 2004.
Johansen, S. & Juselius, K. 1990. Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on 
cointergration. With applications to the demand for money. University of Oxford Journal. 52(2):
169-210.
Kalenga, P. 2001. Monetary policy framework in Namibia. Occasional Paper, Bank of Namibia. 
Karamanou, P., Mahadeva, L., Robinson, P. & Syrichas, G. (n.d.) Monetary transmission 
mechanism in Cyprus: a fixed exchange rate case. Available online at: www.google.com.
[Accessed 18 August 2010].
McCoy, D. 1997. How useful is structural VAR analysis for Irish economics? CBI Technical 
Paper, 2/RT/9
Mehrotra, A. 2006. Essays on empirical macroeconomics. Bank of England.
Muco, M., Sanfey, P. & Taci, A. 2003. Inflation, exchange rates and the role of monetary policy
in Albania. Fourth International Conference on Albanian Economy, Performance and Policy 
Challenges, September 11-12, 2003 in Saranda, Albania.
Örnek, T. 2009. The operation of monetary transmission mechanism channels in Turkey. Finance 
Journal 156: 104-125.
Pindyck, R.S. & Rubinfield, D.L. 1991. Econometric models & economic forecasts. McGraw-
Hill, Inc. International Editions.
Ramlogan, C. 2004. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Evidence from the 
Caribbean. Journal of Economic Studies, 31(5): 435-447.
Ramos-Francia, M. & Sidaoui, J.J. 2008. The monetary transmission mechanism in Mexico:
recent developments. BIS Papers No 35.
Samkharadze, B. 2008. Monetary transmission mechanism in Georgia: analyzing pass-through
of different channels. Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Belgium.
Sezer, B. 2003. Monetary transmission mechanism and its operation in Turkey. MBA Thesis, 
Ankara University Social Sciences Institute., Turkey.
Svensson, L.E.O. 2001. The zero bound in an open economy: a foolproof way of escaping from a 
liquidity trap. Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies 19: 277-312.
Zengin, A. 2000. The movements of real exchange rate and foreign trade prices empirical 
evidence on Turkey’s economy. Journal of C.U. Faculty of Economics and Administrative 
Sciences, 2: 27-41.
28 Journal for Development and Leadership
Developing Francistown as a Tourism City
Developing a city for a tourism purpose needs a different approach than developing a city for 
residents. Although the developmental logistics may be similar, the objectives and strategies may 
differ. For example, tourism superstructures have to meet certain grading standards and need to 
be accessible in places less congested, whereas the public infrastructures are not graded and are 
accessible by large number of people.  In general, city dwellers usually have excellent access to 
clean water, free public schools, public libraries and public hospitals (Teaford, 1984). Similarly, 
people who live in Francistown and the surrounding areas have access to various facilities and
the government provides such public health facilities, schools and other services. Public 
infrastructure is usually developed based on the number of people in need of such services 
(Fainstein & Stokes, 1998). In contrast, tourism facilities are developed based on the availability
of tourist attractions within the vicinity of the locations. This cannot be said about Francistown 
because the city links various parts of Botswana with the key tourism destinations such as the 
Chobe National Park and the Okavango Delta, yet very few tourist facilities are available in the 
city. Francistown does not have recreation facilities either, which means that local tourists do not 
have anywhere to pass the time.
In general, the development of tourist destinations is an integral aspect in the tourism sector and 
many researchers approach it using various strategies and tactics (Henderson, 2006). Francistown 
is not an exception to this approach because it has the potential to become one of the tourism 
hubs in Botswana. In developing a place as a tourism destination, certain factors including 
infrastructures and superstructures need to be taken into consideration and should be available in 
such a place (Henderson, 2006). In this regard, the tourism planners and relevant authorities such 
as the city council need to develop some facilities and infrastructure that can make the city of 
Francistown more attractive, not only to the local tourists, but to tourists and visitors in general.
This includes the development of roads, recreation facilities, shopping malls and restaurants of 
international standard.
The development of Francistown into a tourism destination may not only benefit tourists, but it 
would be an economic diversification initiative. Diversification and privatisation have the 
potential to benefit tourism industry, not only in Francistown, but in Botswana in general. There 
are strong marketing initiatives, both locally and internationally, by the Botswana Tourism 
Organisation and the country’s tourism offers the peace and tranquillity for which Botswana is 
renowned and which play an integral role in the development and promotion of tourism 
destinations (WTO, 2005b).
Besides peace and stability, the other aspect which is paramount to development is the 
availability of varying types of complementary and competing organisations from both the 
private and public sector (Palvovich, 2003). Francistown in particular has both complementing 
public sectors and competing tourism organisations from the private sector which would make 
the development of the city into a tourism hub ideal.
In developing Francistown as a tourism destination, tourism planners should adhere to the 
principles of sustainable tourism development. Sustainable development refers to developmental 
strategies and resources utilisation that meet the needs of the present generation without 
jeopardising the future generation from meeting its needs from the same resources (WCED, 
1987). In this context, sustainable development is considered a dynamic process that facilitates 
human needs and aspirations for both current and future generations (WCED, 1987).
Furthermore, the World Tourism Organisation (WTO, 2001) maintains that sustainable tourism 
development aims to meet the needs of the current tourists and host communities while creating 
the potential for the future population to meet their needs. It is therefore envisaged that the 
development of Francistown as tourism destination should lead to the management of all 
resources in such a way that social and economic needs are satisfied without compromising
growth that the country enjoys. 
Figure 1 presents a Botswana map depicting Francistown and a number of tourist locations such as 
national parks, lakes, deserts, and the other physical features. The map also shows countries 
sharing borders with Botswana. The country’s history has an influence on its economic situation. 
For example, Botswana is renowned for its peace and tranquillity and this has helped the country 
to grow economically.  
Figure 1: Map of Botswana 
 
 
Source: Shoortravel (2008) 
The Botswana citizens constitute various ethnic groups and the dominant group in Francistown is 
the Kalanga group (Botswana Population Census, 2001). The Kalanga group has rich cultural 
artefacts that can be showcased to visitors (Botswana population Census, 2001). As a matter of 
fact, there is a cultural village 80km from Francistown which hosts an annual cultural event but 
neither the event nor the village are properly marketed for tourism purposes. Tourism authorities 
in Francistown should take advantage of the fact that Botswana has been an independent and 
democratic country since 1966. Botswana was colonised by Britain, and it was historically 
known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The country acquired its current name, Botswana, after 
the country’s independence on 30 September 1966. The fact that Botswana is an independent and 
a democratic country has significantly contributed to its economic development and it has the 
potential to influence tourism growth in the country because tourists often prefer to visit 
destinations that are safe. Botswana’s economy is largely dependent on the country’s diamond 
mining, tourism and agriculture industries, and it is closely tied to its neighbouring state, South 
Africa (Botswana’s Department of Tourism, 2008). The period from colonialism to independence 
earmarks the economic and democratic systems of the country. Tourism is one of the key 
economic sectors in Botswana and its contribution to the Botswana’s economy is significant 
(Botswana’s Department of Tourism, 2008).  
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Sustainable development should ensure that tourism benefits accrue to the local community, 
particularly those living in poverty. This emphasis is based on the fact that the host communities 
often bear the negative consequences of tourism activities taking place in their localities 
(Bramwell, 1998; Mbaiwa, 2005). People living in poverty are likely to engage in unethical and 
unsustainable developmental activities in order to meet their basic needs (Bramwell, 1998). It is 
also imperative for tourism developers to understand that tourism development utilises the 
valuable resources that could be a source of livelihood for the host communities and that host 
communities should benefit from tourism is not a bonus but a right. When host communities see 
the value of tourism and actually benefit from it, they are likely to support and protect the 
location’s natural and cultural environments (Smith, 1994). Similarly, if the host communities are 
not happy and do not support tourism activities in their localities, they may not be hospitable to 
the visitors and this in turn may discourage tourists from visiting that particular destination. 
However, involving the ordinary host community in tourism development is often a difficult
exercise, particularly in developing countries such as Botswana (Tosun, 2000). Sustainable 
tourism development therefore needs to maintain a balance between meeting the needs of 
tourists, the tourism enterprises, local communities, and protecting the environment (Bramwell & 
Lane, 2000).
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
This section of the research focuses on analysing the empirical data. The data is analysed using
various graphs and tables based on the key issue of the research. The Likert scale of five items 
ranging fron ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ was used in data collection. In identifying the 
respondents, all tourism organisations, including the private and public sectors, in Francistown 
were approached to seek their consent. It is important to note that tourism in Francistown and in 
Botswana in general is still at its developmental stage. A total of 39 repondents participated in
the research. As already indicated, the number of respondents is a true representative of the 
population working in the tourism sector in Francisstown. It is important to note that 
otganisations were represented by individuals who were identified by their respective managers
to participate in the study. Not all organisations approached answered the questionnaire but most 
organisations responded to the questionnaire. This was a self-administered questionnaire in 
which the respondents were given the questionnaire to answer on their own. Prior to the 
distribution of the questionnaire to the respondents, the questionnaire and the purpose of the 
research were discussed with the potential respondents in various organisations. Managers from 
various tourism organisations were approached and were asked to identify possible respondents 
in their respective departments. Specifically, a snowballing approach was used to identify the 
respondents. The study object constitutes people who are directly involved in the tourism sector 
in Francistown. Of the people who participated on the research, 64 per cent were women aged
between 20 and 29 years. This shows that women play important role in the Botswana tourism 
sector. The respondents were all citizens of Botswana who have undergraduate degrees in 
tourism management. Table 1 presents results on how participants responded to the various 
items:
cultural and ecological integrity. This means developing tourism in such a way that the host 
community’s standard of living is improved while enhancing both services for increased numbers
of tourist in the city and in the country in general as well as promoting environmental protection. 
Sustainable tourism development is more concerned with the management of developmental 
changes associated with tourism (Liu & Jones, 1996). In developing Francistown as a tourism 
destination, stakeholders should be mindful of all types of tourism, either conventional or 
alternative, that are compatible with sustainable development. The Botswana tourism industry is 
mainly nature-based and is predominantly found in the northern part of the country. Besides 
nature-based tourism, Botswana has little to offer in terms of recreational facilities. Tourism 
planners and developers should be mindful that not all tourists who come to Botswana come to 
see wildlife and that some may wish to visit other interesting areas. Also, tourism development 
significantly depends on supply and demand factors. Therefore, the development of tourism 
facilities and services in Francistown may motivate both local and international tourists to visit 
the city. Besides tourism product diversification, demand management is also essential in 
sustaining Botswana’s nature-based tourism and effective marketing can direct tourist demand to 
places that are less sensitive to tourism impact. Environmental degradation has more significant 
impacts on a fragile environment such as an ecotourism environment than on an urban 
environment.
The development of attractions such as theme parks is paramount in helping the country to attract 
a number of tourists who would otherwise have exacerbated touristic pressure on the wildlife 
environment. As already stated earlier, the natural environment is the basis for the Botswana 
success story in the tourism sector. This justifies the reasons why the Botswana tourism policy is 
more intent on protecting the natural environment. From the wider perspective, tourism resources 
extend beyond natural resources, and include tourist attractions such as the natural environment, 
cultural and purpose-built attractions (Friedman, 1992). In addition, facilities such as 
infrastructure and superstructure play an integral role in support of tourist activities. Hospitable 
host communities and social settings enhance positive tourist experiences (Hitchcock et al,
1993). It is imperative for tourism planners and developers to understand that the development of 
a tourism destination cannot be done in isolation, but is a collaborative effort involving the 
tourism agencies such as tour operators, travel agents, the private sector, and national tourism 
organisations such as the Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO) and the Department of Tourism 
(DOT). This collaboration is critical in packaging and marketing the whole destination locally, 
regionally and internationally.
Besides packaging and promoting Botswana as a tourist destination, the government of Botswana 
and other tourism role players should promote social and economic development initiatives.
Special attention should be aimed at improving the standard of living conditions of host 
communities, not only in Francistown as a prospective tourism destination, but in other key 
tourism destinations in which host communities are said to be living in poverty (Botswana’s 
Department of Tourism, 2008). It is unfortunate that host communities are living in in poverty in 
close proximity to the key tourism destinations in Botswana, especially when one considers that 
tourism is Botswana’s second economic contributor after diamond mining. This shows that the 
development of tourism in Botswana does not fully comply with the principles of sustainable 
development that stipulate that sustainable development should aim to meet the needs of host 
communities in terms of improving living standards in both the short and long terms (Friedman, 
1992). In general, the global trend is that the tourism potential has not yet been realised, and in 
developing countries in particular poverty and social inequality imply that there is a great need 
for the host communities to benefit from and actively participate in tourism developmental 
activities in their area (Liu, 2003).
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Sustainable development should ensure that tourism benefits accrue to the local community, 
particularly those living in poverty. This emphasis is based on the fact that the host communities 
often bear the negative consequences of tourism activities taking place in their localities 
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location’s natural and cultural environments (Smith, 1994). Similarly, if the host communities are 
not happy and do not support tourism activities in their localities, they may not be hospitable to 
the visitors and this in turn may discourage tourists from visiting that particular destination. 
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exercise, particularly in developing countries such as Botswana (Tosun, 2000). Sustainable 
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Lane, 2000).
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
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in Francistown. Of the people who participated on the research, 64 per cent were women aged
between 20 and 29 years. This shows that women play important role in the Botswana tourism 
sector. The respondents were all citizens of Botswana who have undergraduate degrees in 
tourism management. Table 1 presents results on how participants responded to the various 
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tourism agencies such as tour operators, travel agents, the private sector, and national tourism 
organisations such as the Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO) and the Department of Tourism 
(DOT). This collaboration is critical in packaging and marketing the whole destination locally, 
regionally and internationally.
Besides packaging and promoting Botswana as a tourist destination, the government of Botswana 
and other tourism role players should promote social and economic development initiatives.
Special attention should be aimed at improving the standard of living conditions of host 
communities, not only in Francistown as a prospective tourism destination, but in other key 
tourism destinations in which host communities are said to be living in poverty (Botswana’s 
Department of Tourism, 2008). It is unfortunate that host communities are living in in poverty in 
close proximity to the key tourism destinations in Botswana, especially when one considers that 
tourism is Botswana’s second economic contributor after diamond mining. This shows that the 
development of tourism in Botswana does not fully comply with the principles of sustainable 
development that stipulate that sustainable development should aim to meet the needs of host 
communities in terms of improving living standards in both the short and long terms (Friedman, 
1992). In general, the global trend is that the tourism potential has not yet been realised, and in 
developing countries in particular poverty and social inequality imply that there is a great need 
for the host communities to benefit from and actively participate in tourism developmental 
activities in their area (Liu, 2003).
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tourism creates employment. Besides creating employment, tourism contributes significantly to 
the country’s GDP. Francistown would benefit from this contribution and the development of the 
city into a tourism destination would enhance the contribution of the sector to the city and to the 
country in general. Figure 2 depicts the respondents’ perception of the economic contribution of 
tourism in Francistown, particularly as regards employment creation.   
Figure 2: Respondents’ perceptions of tourism and employment   
 
Most respondents (69%) as indicated in Figure 2 affirm that tourism creates employment in their 
locality. This shows that the development of Francistown as a tourism destination is an ideal 
strategy. Besides employment creation, tourism motivates host communities to be more 
conscious of the need to maintain and improve the appearance of the area. This includes keeping 
the environment clean and being environmentally friendly. The concept of responsible tourism 
cannot be over-emphasised in Francistown and in Botswana in general because it is a notion that 
the world has adopted. Tourism also plays a vital role not only in economic diversification but 
also in development as it fosters infrastructural development that improves the ambience of the 
host destination. When host communities recognise the importance of tourism for their location, 
they are likely to promote conservation strategies and practise sustainable tourism development. 
This, in return, provides quality of life for both current and future generations.  
The contribution of tourism to host communities’ quality of life varies and people often have 
varying perceptions on whether tourism positively contributes to their lives. Based on this 
research, 33 per cent of the respondents confirmed that the economic benefits of tourism to the 
communities are overrated, 31 per cent of the respondents were neutral, 18 per cent of the 
respondents disagreed with statement, and 18 per cent of the respondents did not answer the 
question. The fact that a significant number of the respondents indicated that the economic 
benefits of tourism to the communities are overrated could mean that the economic benefits of 
tourism do not accrue to the host communities, particularly those living in poverty. This means 
that there is a need for policy intervention to ensure that tourism benefits the host communities 
and to use tourism as a poverty alleviation strategy. Community involvement and benefit from 
tourism are some of the principles of sustainable tourism development. Furthermore, when host 
communities benefit from tourism, they are likely to support tourism developmental initiatives 
taking place in their localities, which in return will help the country to diversify the economy 
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Tourism contributes to the economic development of Botswana because it creates both direct and 
indirect employment. Of the people who answered the questionnire, 27 out of 39 indicated that 
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tourism could be promoted and ordinary community members be given the opportunity to sell 
their artefacts such as basketry and traditional attire. There is a need for the government to
allocate certain portions of the land to community projects for open markets in which the 
community members may operate. 
Francistown indeed has the potential to become a tourism destination. Developing the city into a 
tourism destination is imperative for poverty alleviation, not only in Francistown but in Botswana 
in general because employment created by such initiatives is not only for people living in the city 
but elsewhere as well. Besides poverty alleviation and employment creation, the development of 
Francistown into a tourism destination is essential in diversifying the Botswana tourism product 
which is largely dependent on wildlife tourism. It is important to note that not all tourists,
international or local, are interested in wildlife viewing. Some tourists visit a destination for other 
reasons other than wildlife viewing e.g. urban and cultural tourists. 
CONCLUSION
Tourism has the potential to diversify the Botswana tourism sector which is largely dependent on 
wildlife tourism. Tourism also has the potential to diversify the country’s economy which is 
largely dependent on diamond mining. Developing Francistown as tourist destination is essential 
in diversifying the tourism product in Botswana. Francistown in the second largest city in the 
country after Gaborone. The city is a transit location for people travelling to Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Namibia and Maun. Like many towns in Botswana, Francistown experiences a high rate of 
unemployment and poverty. Developing Francistown as one of the Botswana’s key tourism 
destinations is imperative in order to create opportunities for employment and small-scale 
entrepreneurs, particularly for members of the host community.
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In general, the tourism economic benefits accrue more to the minority than the majority and this 
results in many people being reluctant to support tourism developmental initiatives in their 
respective communities. In Botswana in particular, most of the tourism enterprises are owned by 
the foreign investors who are in most cases criticised for not being concerned about the host 
communities’ socio-economic problems such as poverty. Tourism does indeed create 
employment but such employment is also criticised in terms of  low wages which do not alleviate 
the poverty within the communities. To a large extent, some people working for tourism 
organisations do not necessarily hale from host communities but from elsewhere in Botswana or 
even from outside Botswana. Tourism generally comes with some socio-economic problems such 
as commercial sex work due to movement and interaction between tourists and host 
communities. The situation is worse in scenarios in which the host communities constitute people 
living in poverty who may opt to engage in commercial sex work as a survival strategy.  
Unemployment exacerbates poverty levels in various communities, including Francistown, and 
tourism has the potential to create employment which in turn may alleviate poverty.  
Considering the socio-economic problems associated with tourism, it is imperative for policy 
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community members, particularly those living in poverty. Developing Francistown into a tourism 
destination is imperative in addressing the poverty and unemployment problems. Figure 3 depicts 
respondents’ views on developing Francistown into a tourism destination. 
Figure 3: Perceptions of respondents on developing Francistown as a tourism destination  
    
All the respondents agree that Francistown needs to be developed into one of the key tourism 
destinations in Botswana. This means that the government needs to allocate land for tourism 
enterprises and encourage investors to invest in tourism businesses in Francistown. The key 
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and its surrounds in all stages of planning and implementation. As part of tourism development 
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in general because employment created by such initiatives is not only for people living in the city 
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Francistown into a tourism destination is essential in diversifying the Botswana tourism product 
which is largely dependent on wildlife tourism. It is important to note that not all tourists,
international or local, are interested in wildlife viewing. Some tourists visit a destination for other 
reasons other than wildlife viewing e.g. urban and cultural tourists. 
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in diversifying the tourism product in Botswana. Francistown in the second largest city in the 
country after Gaborone. The city is a transit location for people travelling to Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Namibia and Maun. Like many towns in Botswana, Francistown experiences a high rate of 
unemployment and poverty. Developing Francistown as one of the Botswana’s key tourism 
destinations is imperative in order to create opportunities for employment and small-scale 
entrepreneurs, particularly for members of the host community.
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POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR
SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS 2055
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article was to develop four scenarios for South Africa over the next forty 
years: Mandela’s Dream in which positive elements come into function for South Africa’s
economy and governance; the Historical African Syndrome, in which the key driving forces 
unfold in an uneven pattern, or have a differentiated impact on South Africa’s economy; the 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly in which less good governance prevails, but where a fortunate 
economy and firm national management allow South Africa to become competitive and benefit 
from satisfactory economic growth; and the Pyramid Syndrome scenario in which negative 
regional drivers of change corrode positive policies and initiatives in a manner which 
compounds the pre-existing threats to South Africa’s growth. The goal of this article was not only 
to affirm what is already known and knowable about what is happening right now at the 
intersections of South Africa and its economy, but also to explore the many ways South Africa 
can strengthen judicial governance and the rule of law by scenario planning, a methodology 
designed to help researchers, nations and organisations alike through this creative process. This 
article begins by identifying selected forces of change, and then combines these forces in 
different ways to create a set of scenarios about how the future of South Africa could evolve 
towards 2055.
Keywords: Future studies; drivers for change; scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
There is widespread recognition that mankind is living in an era of rapid change in which new 
discoveries, philosophies and technologies play an ever more prominent part in shaping social 
and economic development (UN, 2007; World Bank, 2008). The world is becoming increasingly 
complex, more competitive and better connected. There is economic internationalisation on the 
one hand, and cultural decentralisation on the other (Moberg, 2012; UN, 2011). 
Society has shifted from an industrial base to an information and knowledge orientation whereby 
advances in genetics, materials, energy, computing, robotics, miniaturisation, medicines, 
therapies and communication proceed apace (National School Boards Association, 2008; World 
Bank, 2002). The developed world, moreover, is now becoming smaller, older and wealthier, 
whilst the developing world grows bigger, younger and relatively poorer (UN, 2009; UN, 2011). 
A blurring of boundaries between disciplines, industries and social enterprises is taking place and 
as those boundaries fade, the lines connecting the constituent parts become more critical, so that 
network systems and holistic thinking are more meaningful (Mazarr, 2005; Ratcliffe & Saurin, 
2007). Towards 2055, rapidly shifting trends and unforeseeable global crises will test any and all 
countries, leaving no power untouched (UN; 2001; Peters, 2011). Silke (2011) points out that 
there is a close relationship between human development, and global economic and political 
sense.
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planning and the leadership actions resulting from these scenarios (Geldenhuys, 2006; Moya, 
2012; Yoe, 2004, 2012).
This article will attempt to indicate how different approaches to, or solutions provided by, the 
scenario process will lead to different outcomes. This article will also not attempt to predict the 
future, but rather to illustrate the plausible futures, taking into account the current prevailing and 
future forces and factors, both external and internal, that will make an impact on the Republic of 
South Africa. Future research studies indicate that too many forces work against the possibility of 
obtaining the right forecast (Caldwell, 2010; Hartmann, 2009; Herbst & Mills, 2006). Analysing 
the macro- and microenvironment assists this research effort by identifying the key factors that 
have an impact on South Africa, either positively or negatively. By identifying the drivers for 
change, this research strives to determine the risks and problems that prevent South Africa’s 
progress and development.  
DRIVERS FOR CHANGE AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA
A definition of a driver involves the result of the transformation in an environment brought on by 
any natural or human-induced factor that directly or indirectly causes a change (Carpenter et al,
2006). A direct driver indisputably influences specific processes. An indirect driver operates 
more diffusely by altering one or more direct drivers.
Driving forces can be viewed as uncertain, as they are influenced by the rapidity of change. This 
makes it harder to anticipate the future (Kasperson, Kasperson & Turner, 1995). This uncertainty 
is not only influenced by the rapidity of change, but also by the new ways and values of looking 
at change (and the inherent conflicts of these new values and the existing and familiar ones) and 
of course, the driving forces of change (Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001). Researchers and decision-
makers will need to understand paradigm shifts and driving forces in order to combat this 
uncertainty (Caldwell, 2010). 
Driving forces are adequately strong, enabling a direct course of expansion of the society and 
changes in the environment (Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001; Nelson et al, 2006). Driving forces set 
the preliminary course for development, and their impacts are powerful enough to change the 
course of progress. Their effects can be short and sharp, or long lasting (Caldwell, 2010; Nelson
et al, 2006). Driving forces function at various levels of intensity and scale, reverse direction, and 
appear or disappear as the case may be (Kasperson et al, 1995). The development of the 
scenarios is then based on the identification and articulation of the driving forces. Driving forces 
therefore are elements that can cause change to occur and their unfolding and interaction are 
responsible for the trends envisaged in each scenario (Hartmann, 2009).
ECONOMIC DRIVERS FOR CHANGE AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS 
2050
The international economic system as constructed following the Second World War will be
almost unrecognisable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalising economy, an 
historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing 
influence of non-state actors (Grant, 2010). By 2025, the international economic system will be a 
global multi-polar one with continually narrowing gaps in national power between developed and 
developing countries (NIC, 2008). Concurrent with the shift in power among nation states, the 
relative power of various non-state actors including businesses, tribes, religious organisations and 
criminal networks is increasing (Fingar, 2009). The players are changing, but so too are the scope 
and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global economic prosperity.  
BRIC countries have received a medium economic risk rating from Control Risks (2013);
however, South Africa received a low rating for 2013 with regard to political and economic risk. 
A low political and economic risk rating implies that businesses are not able to operate without 
For this reason, broader long-term strategies to foster human development will be the most 
important goals for countries in the future. Strategic positioning will increasingly promote a 
competitive environment, pitting nations against each other for the leading role. 
Therefore, a more educated and globally aware generation paired with rising global challenges 
(often unforeseen) will force governments to let go of “narrow political and ideological” attitudes 
and policies (Bandurskî, 2009; Silke, 2011; UN, 2011).
For international corporations, skills attract investment (UN, 2002; Bulgar, 2011). International 
corporations are attracted to countries that have proven themselves in realms such as “education, 
health care, infrastructure, security of tenure and combating corruption” (Silke, 2011; Bulgar, 
2011; UN, 2011; World Bank, 2012). In a fiercely competitive world, the South African story of 
victory over its past and its evolving new democracy will be of little consequence to corporations
which are looking for good governance in their search for possible investment opportunities (The
China Post, 2011). In order to foster this kind of environment, government’s duty now becomes 
to foster a healthy entrepreneurial, innovative and knowledge-based population that can be 
conducive to business growth (Silke, 2011; UN, 2011; OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2011).
Faced with growing competition on the global market, research findings warn that if the Republic 
of South Africa does not “get its house in order”, it will be left behind in the wake of most other 
countries (World Economic Forum, 2010; Silke, 2011; Anderson, 2011; African Economic 
Outlook, 2011). Globally, countries have already shown and continue to indicate that the state 
can have a pivotal role in securing the confidence of the international community (OECD, 2009, 
Alberti & Bertucci, 2001; Banga, 2003). However, South Africa’s biggest competition might not 
hail from other continents, but may turn out to be the country’s neighbours. Researchers argue 
that South Africa’s political dynamics leave investors with doubt as to whether to invest (Seria, 
2011). Countries such as Zimbabwe, which researchers identify as having no restrictive labour 
laws, can lure investors away from South Africa to elsewhere on the continent (Silke, 2011; 
Seria, 2011; Mammburu, 2011). The danger for South Africa is that it might lose out as Africa’s 
progress heats up competition between the African countries unless the South African 
government can act in an effective and adaptive way (Silke, 2011). IDISA (2011) points out that 
political events in North Africa during 2011 have raised concerns over whether South Africa will 
develop the same problems such as the ‘people’s protest’. The South African government’s 
inability to stem the increasing dissatisfaction with service delivery (which has been 
characterised to be ‘almost certainly violent’) adds to this perception (IDISA, 2011; Higgs, 
2011).
PROBLEM STATEMENT
No one can predict with certainty how the future will develop, yet more than ever researchers and 
decision-makers alike need to think about the probable futures that might originate from the 
unstable conditions that persist, as well as the implications for human choice and action (Herbst 
& Mills, 2006). Countries are continually exposed to the fast-changing external environment of 
the 21st century. Political leaders and decision-makers are faced with daunting challenges 
associated with rapidly fluctuating regulatory and legal changes, macro-economic trends and 
risks, socio-political transformation, globalisation, technological innovation, increasing 
competition, environmental concerns, and societal pressures and expectations (Dess & Pickens, 
2000; Geldenhuys, 2006; Meyer & Boninelli, 2004). It is therefore important for the Republic of 
South Africa to position itself in this rapidly changing, complex and global environment. The 
Republic of South Africa, in striving in the midst of a changing global environment, requires the 
application of scenario-based planning and, if possible, a change in navigation in some form or 
other. Integrating scenario-based planning and institutionalised change navigation may have a 
positive impact on the extent to which people buy into the stories resulting from scenario-based 
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planning and the leadership actions resulting from these scenarios (Geldenhuys, 2006; Moya, 
2012; Yoe, 2004, 2012).
This article will attempt to indicate how different approaches to, or solutions provided by, the 
scenario process will lead to different outcomes. This article will also not attempt to predict the 
future, but rather to illustrate the plausible futures, taking into account the current prevailing and 
future forces and factors, both external and internal, that will make an impact on the Republic of 
South Africa. Future research studies indicate that too many forces work against the possibility of 
obtaining the right forecast (Caldwell, 2010; Hartmann, 2009; Herbst & Mills, 2006). Analysing 
the macro- and microenvironment assists this research effort by identifying the key factors that 
have an impact on South Africa, either positively or negatively. By identifying the drivers for 
change, this research strives to determine the risks and problems that prevent South Africa’s 
progress and development.  
DRIVERS FOR CHANGE AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA
A definition of a driver involves the result of the transformation in an environment brought on by 
any natural or human-induced factor that directly or indirectly causes a change (Carpenter et al,
2006). A direct driver indisputably influences specific processes. An indirect driver operates 
more diffusely by altering one or more direct drivers.
Driving forces can be viewed as uncertain, as they are influenced by the rapidity of change. This 
makes it harder to anticipate the future (Kasperson, Kasperson & Turner, 1995). This uncertainty 
is not only influenced by the rapidity of change, but also by the new ways and values of looking 
at change (and the inherent conflicts of these new values and the existing and familiar ones) and 
of course, the driving forces of change (Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001). Researchers and decision-
makers will need to understand paradigm shifts and driving forces in order to combat this 
uncertainty (Caldwell, 2010). 
Driving forces are adequately strong, enabling a direct course of expansion of the society and 
changes in the environment (Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001; Nelson et al, 2006). Driving forces set 
the preliminary course for development, and their impacts are powerful enough to change the 
course of progress. Their effects can be short and sharp, or long lasting (Caldwell, 2010; Nelson
et al, 2006). Driving forces function at various levels of intensity and scale, reverse direction, and 
appear or disappear as the case may be (Kasperson et al, 1995). The development of the 
scenarios is then based on the identification and articulation of the driving forces. Driving forces 
therefore are elements that can cause change to occur and their unfolding and interaction are 
responsible for the trends envisaged in each scenario (Hartmann, 2009).
ECONOMIC DRIVERS FOR CHANGE AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS 
2050
The international economic system as constructed following the Second World War will be
almost unrecognisable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalising economy, an 
historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing 
influence of non-state actors (Grant, 2010). By 2025, the international economic system will be a 
global multi-polar one with continually narrowing gaps in national power between developed and 
developing countries (NIC, 2008). Concurrent with the shift in power among nation states, the 
relative power of various non-state actors including businesses, tribes, religious organisations and 
criminal networks is increasing (Fingar, 2009). The players are changing, but so too are the scope 
and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global economic prosperity.  
BRIC countries have received a medium economic risk rating from Control Risks (2013);
however, South Africa received a low rating for 2013 with regard to political and economic risk. 
A low political and economic risk rating implies that businesses are not able to operate without 
For this reason, broader long-term strategies to foster human development will be the most 
important goals for countries in the future. Strategic positioning will increasingly promote a 
competitive environment, pitting nations against each other for the leading role. 
Therefore, a more educated and globally aware generation paired with rising global challenges 
(often unforeseen) will force governments to let go of “narrow political and ideological” attitudes 
and policies (Bandurskî, 2009; Silke, 2011; UN, 2011).
For international corporations, skills attract investment (UN, 2002; Bulgar, 2011). International 
corporations are attracted to countries that have proven themselves in realms such as “education, 
health care, infrastructure, security of tenure and combating corruption” (Silke, 2011; Bulgar, 
2011; UN, 2011; World Bank, 2012). In a fiercely competitive world, the South African story of 
victory over its past and its evolving new democracy will be of little consequence to corporations
which are looking for good governance in their search for possible investment opportunities (The
China Post, 2011). In order to foster this kind of environment, government’s duty now becomes 
to foster a healthy entrepreneurial, innovative and knowledge-based population that can be 
conducive to business growth (Silke, 2011; UN, 2011; OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2011).
Faced with growing competition on the global market, research findings warn that if the Republic 
of South Africa does not “get its house in order”, it will be left behind in the wake of most other 
countries (World Economic Forum, 2010; Silke, 2011; Anderson, 2011; African Economic 
Outlook, 2011). Globally, countries have already shown and continue to indicate that the state 
can have a pivotal role in securing the confidence of the international community (OECD, 2009, 
Alberti & Bertucci, 2001; Banga, 2003). However, South Africa’s biggest competition might not 
hail from other continents, but may turn out to be the country’s neighbours. Researchers argue 
that South Africa’s political dynamics leave investors with doubt as to whether to invest (Seria, 
2011). Countries such as Zimbabwe, which researchers identify as having no restrictive labour 
laws, can lure investors away from South Africa to elsewhere on the continent (Silke, 2011; 
Seria, 2011; Mammburu, 2011). The danger for South Africa is that it might lose out as Africa’s 
progress heats up competition between the African countries unless the South African 
government can act in an effective and adaptive way (Silke, 2011). IDISA (2011) points out that 
political events in North Africa during 2011 have raised concerns over whether South Africa will 
develop the same problems such as the ‘people’s protest’. The South African government’s 
inability to stem the increasing dissatisfaction with service delivery (which has been 
characterised to be ‘almost certainly violent’) adds to this perception (IDISA, 2011; Higgs, 
2011).
PROBLEM STATEMENT
No one can predict with certainty how the future will develop, yet more than ever researchers and 
decision-makers alike need to think about the probable futures that might originate from the 
unstable conditions that persist, as well as the implications for human choice and action (Herbst 
& Mills, 2006). Countries are continually exposed to the fast-changing external environment of 
the 21st century. Political leaders and decision-makers are faced with daunting challenges 
associated with rapidly fluctuating regulatory and legal changes, macro-economic trends and 
risks, socio-political transformation, globalisation, technological innovation, increasing 
competition, environmental concerns, and societal pressures and expectations (Dess & Pickens, 
2000; Geldenhuys, 2006; Meyer & Boninelli, 2004). It is therefore important for the Republic of 
South Africa to position itself in this rapidly changing, complex and global environment. The 
Republic of South Africa, in striving in the midst of a changing global environment, requires the 
application of scenario-based planning and, if possible, a change in navigation in some form or 
other. Integrating scenario-based planning and institutionalised change navigation may have a 
positive impact on the extent to which people buy into the stories resulting from scenario-based 
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private sector are heavily relied upon by governance, even though the purposes of these sectors 
vary depending on the priorities and principles of a set social system (Herbst & Mills, 2009).
Governance is found within the political, economic and administrative sectors, and it can affect 
expansion, which includes the potential for sustainable environmental management, market 
efficiency and the understanding of basic rights. First-rate governance is able to develop 
economic development as well as the potential to produce fresh opportunities for improving 
human well-being as well as general development (Hartmann, 2009).
Some argue South Africa has made significant progress in the provision of basic services such as 
housing, water and electricity (UNDP, 2010). The foundations for a capable state have been laid, 
but there are major concerns about the weakness in how these structures function, which 
constrain South Africa’s ability to pursue key development objectives (Edigheji, 2007; 
Adendorff, 2011; Silke, 2011). The uneven performance of the public service results from the 
interplay between a complex set of factors, including tension in the political administrative 
interface, instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability
and authority, poor organisational design, inappropriate staffing and low staff morale (Grafton, 
2010; NDP, 2011; Davis, 2012; Silke, 2011).  
The temptation of quick fixes has diverted attention from more fundamental priorities, 
particularly the deficit in skills and professionalism affecting all elements of the public service 
(Governance, 2000). At senior levels, reporting and recruitment structures allow far too much 
political interference in selecting and managing senior staff (NDP, 2011; Silke, 2011).
The result has been unnecessary turbulence in senior posts in the public service and reduced 
confidence in the leadership, which undermines the morale of public servants and the confidence 
of citizens in South Africa (Hughes, 2003). Therefore, South Africa has struggled to achieve 
constructive relations between the three spheres of government. A lack of clarity about the 
division and coordination of powers and responsibilities together with the lack of coherent and 
predictable mechanisms for delegating or assigning functions has created tensions and instability 
across the three spheres (Heyns & Stefiszyn, 2006; Silke, 2011).  
South Africa has yet to balance the need for public servants to be responsive to the priorities of 
the South African government of the day with the need for the public service to treat citizens 
equally and not discriminate on grounds of political allegiance (Hadley, 2002; Kalombo, 2005; 
NDP, 2011). There also has yet to be a clear demarcation between the roles and responsibilities 
of public servants and their political principles (Mafunisa, 2003; Greene, 2006; Essel, 2012).
Where the public service is too insulated from political pressures, this is likely to lead to 
concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government and is therefore not fulfilling its 
democratic mandate. However, where the public service is insufficiently insulated, standards can 
be undermined in South Africa as public servants are recruited on the basis of political 
connections rather than skills and expertise, or access to state resources and services become 
defined by political affiliation rather than citizenship (Gounev, 2010; NDP, 2011; Sherwood, 
2012; Silke, 2012).
Although South Africa is governed as a parliamentary democracy (Bureau of African Affairs, 
2010; Essel, 2012), this democratic country has numerous identifiable political pressure groups 
such as labour. These groups have instigated strikes in the past during which the entire country 
has come to an economic standstill, which makes it obvious that these labour unions are crucial 
political pressure groups in South Africa (Pekeur, 2003; Essel, 2012). South Africa has been 
identified as one of the more stable economies on the African continent and it has been argued 
that South Africa has been the economic giant of Africa, and not only the leading producer of 
minerals, but also the country with the highest industrial output on the African continent 
(McKinsey, 2010; Essel, 2012). However, foreign investors also generally associate business in 
South Africa with corruption (Zaayman, 2003; Silke, 2011). South Africa has also constantly 
any inconvenience. Political organisations are expected to be stable, although the possibility 
remains that adverse policy changes may occur. The possibility that regulatory or judicial 
insecurity can become an issue is unlikely, but non-government actors could obstruct business 
activities from time to time (Control Risks, 2009; Essel, 2012).  
South Africa has been highly represented by its diverse cultures, which may be extremely 
valuable since terrorism has often been linked strongly to religious and cultural issues (Silke, 
2010). The country’s diverse cultures, however, have sometimes given rise to ethnic conflict 
(Venter, 2005: 39; Essel, 2012). Issues around Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) have often 
presented economic risk factors (Acemoglu, 2007). This has usually come in the form of 
potential government intervention. Employment in most instances has been hampered by 
affirmative action quotas whereby management is sometimes prevented from selecting the most 
suitable persons for particular positions and therefore the country’s development has 
consequently been restrained (Venter, 2005: 40; Zaayman, 2003: 38; Essel, 2012).  
In order for South Africa to achieve its national goals of eradicating poverty, lowering inequality, 
creating jobs and making the transition to a resilient low-carbon economy, foreign relations must 
be driven by the country’s domestic economic, political and social demands, as well as by our 
regional, continental and global obligations (National Development Plan, 2011). Meeting these 
expectations and obligations can be achieved through a clear understanding of global shifts in 
power and influence from West to East, regional formations in Africa, and the emergence of 
powers such as Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia and Columbia, some of which are vying for a voice in 
early 21st century international relations (NDP, 2011).  
Bobby Godsell, chairman of Business Leadership South Africa and a member of the high-
powered government-sponsored National Planning Commission, argues that South Africa could 
become to Africa what Japan was to Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Godsell (2010) makes the 
telling point that South Africa is leading the modernisation of a continent of a billion with huge 
unmet needs. The world is set to change; the decades to 2050 are likely to be the most dramatic 
and potentially testing for all humanity (NIC, 2008). Will South Africa cope and perform within 
such a competitive and demanding international climate? As with most countries, South Africa 
will move into an even more competitive environment where competing regions, cities and 
nation-states seek to alleviate the pressures of all these key question marks impeding economic 
growth (UNEP, 2012). Given that a second industrial revolution from the developed to 
developing world is now upon us and is likely to shape the future to 2050 and beyond, South 
Africa will be closely analysed by external players, investment houses and rating agencies. The 
use of key criteria to establish the propensity for a nation’s success is a transparent process that 
can elevate smaller countries to fashionable investment destinations or relegate bigger names to a
declining status (Anderson, 1993; Hill, 2008). This will be South Africa’s most testing time as it 
pits domestic policy constraints against the relentless tide of global change (Ukwandu, 2009).
And all the while South Africa has to provide for its people in one of the most competitive eras 
the world has ever experienced.
POLITICAL DRIVERS
The study of world politics now comprises a broad range of disciplinary and theoretical 
perspectives (Brasset & Bulley, 2007). Such breadth holds important implications for 
understanding ethics and “the ethical” in world politics (Sander-Staudt, 2011). Where once 
International Relations (IR) claimed a monopoly over the study of world affairs, there is now a 
plurality of capable observers from disciplines like Geography, International Political Economy, 
Futurology and Sociology.
Governance (local, national and regional) relies on values and principles that the public holds 
(Hartmann, 2009; Kennedy, 2003). The political relations between the state, civil society and the 
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private sector are heavily relied upon by governance, even though the purposes of these sectors 
vary depending on the priorities and principles of a set social system (Herbst & Mills, 2009).
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efficiency and the understanding of basic rights. First-rate governance is able to develop 
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but there are major concerns about the weakness in how these structures function, which 
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interface, instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability
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constructive relations between the three spheres of government. A lack of clarity about the 
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Where the public service is too insulated from political pressures, this is likely to lead to 
concerns that it is failing to serve the interests of the government and is therefore not fulfilling its 
democratic mandate. However, where the public service is insufficiently insulated, standards can 
be undermined in South Africa as public servants are recruited on the basis of political 
connections rather than skills and expertise, or access to state resources and services become 
defined by political affiliation rather than citizenship (Gounev, 2010; NDP, 2011; Sherwood, 
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that South Africa has been the economic giant of Africa, and not only the leading producer of 
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South Africa with corruption (Zaayman, 2003; Silke, 2011). South Africa has also constantly 
any inconvenience. Political organisations are expected to be stable, although the possibility 
remains that adverse policy changes may occur. The possibility that regulatory or judicial 
insecurity can become an issue is unlikely, but non-government actors could obstruct business 
activities from time to time (Control Risks, 2009; Essel, 2012).  
South Africa has been highly represented by its diverse cultures, which may be extremely 
valuable since terrorism has often been linked strongly to religious and cultural issues (Silke, 
2010). The country’s diverse cultures, however, have sometimes given rise to ethnic conflict 
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be driven by the country’s domestic economic, political and social demands, as well as by our 
regional, continental and global obligations (National Development Plan, 2011). Meeting these 
expectations and obligations can be achieved through a clear understanding of global shifts in 
power and influence from West to East, regional formations in Africa, and the emergence of 
powers such as Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia and Columbia, some of which are vying for a voice in 
early 21st century international relations (NDP, 2011).  
Bobby Godsell, chairman of Business Leadership South Africa and a member of the high-
powered government-sponsored National Planning Commission, argues that South Africa could 
become to Africa what Japan was to Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Godsell (2010) makes the 
telling point that South Africa is leading the modernisation of a continent of a billion with huge 
unmet needs. The world is set to change; the decades to 2050 are likely to be the most dramatic 
and potentially testing for all humanity (NIC, 2008). Will South Africa cope and perform within 
such a competitive and demanding international climate? As with most countries, South Africa 
will move into an even more competitive environment where competing regions, cities and 
nation-states seek to alleviate the pressures of all these key question marks impeding economic 
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And all the while South Africa has to provide for its people in one of the most competitive eras 
the world has ever experienced.
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perspectives (Brasset & Bulley, 2007). Such breadth holds important implications for 
understanding ethics and “the ethical” in world politics (Sander-Staudt, 2011). Where once 
International Relations (IR) claimed a monopoly over the study of world affairs, there is now a 
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42 Journal for Development and Leadership
First scenario – Mandela’s Dream
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela had a dream for South Africa. He dreamed of a South Africa “which 
is in peace with itself”. As the father of South African democracy and the pioneer of peace, 
Mandela yearned for a rainbow nation, where all South Africans were united. Mandela’s dream 
for the people of South Africa was to have an economically free nation, where democracy, peace 
and security were a way of life for all her citizens. Mandela’s biggest hope for South Africa was 
the creation of a literate youth. He emphasised good and possibly free education for all, as he 
believed that “…education is a powerful weapon that we can use to change the world”. He 
yearned for a nation that could read the Constitution of her country, one which included and 
protected all races, religions and genders who were blessed enough to see the dawning of a new 
South Africa. 
Mandela’s Dream is therefore the idealistic hope of all nations around the world. It is a 
government modelled on all factors leading to a successful and self-sufficient world power. It is a 
nation which relies on good governance, sound economic policies and a favourable regional 
environment to produce strong economic growth. Under such conditions, South Africa can reap 
the benefits of a government that delivers social and judicial services everywhere, one that 
upgrades social and economic infrastructure and maintains security for all. It is a country which
maintains high standards of democracy – a far cry from her dark and politically unstable past. 
With South Africa’s human rights, transparency, budget discipline and a tough stance against
corruption, South Africa wins her people’s confidence. Carefully designed economic reforms are 
undertaken and foreign investment is sought, allowing for a more competitive economy where 
indigenous ownership and access to capital is encouraged. 
By 2055, South Africa has known years of peace, where democracy has been the pride of her 
people. She has enjoyed a time of incorrupt governance, with a sound 5-6 per cent year on end 
economic growth in GDP and lower unemployment and poverty rates. South Africa is basking in 
her democratic glory, where a better quality of life is promised to all. South Africans no longer 
stand together in protest, but rather as a nation joined in unity on their journey towards 
forgiveness, healing and, most importantly, evolving into a country free from oppression. 
By 2055, South Africa has enjoyed four decades of a new set of governance and values. South 
Africa is now a country which places great emphasis on the quality of life of all her citizens, 
solidarity amongst them and environmental protectionism - beliefs which are polar opposites to a 
country once governed by the creed of consumerism and individualism. South Africa is now a 
country which enjoys pro-environment and anti-poverty policies, galvanising sustainable 
economic development. The enhancement of a good quality of a life for all has become the 
foundation for growth in South Africa. As a nation, she has witnessed a departure from the old 
capitalist economic system, and is now a country which strives for the employment of moral and 
value-based politics. South Africa is now a beacon of light which leads by example and sets new 
standards as part of BRICS in promoting greater solidarity among developing countries. 
Towards 2055, South Africa has seen many benefits and growth since her integration into global 
economics and part of the BRICS group of countries. In the past four decades leading up to 2055, 
there has been strong integration of the South African economy, a relatively benign political 
context and worldwide progress on tackling environmental risks. It is because of her involvement 
in global economics that strong institutions have emerged out of Southern Africa. This 
institutional strength has been welcomed by an ever-growing and strengthening South African 
economy. The emergences of these institutions have also enhanced international trade, allowing 
South Africa to join the ranks of other international trade powerhouses and to help establish the 
global agreements on the mobility workers. This ever-evolving and strengthening globalisation of 
South African corporations has helped increase the competition for both skilled and unskilled 
labour.
faced threats of expropriation in the recent past, as issues surrounding land reform and the 
nationalisation of mines have been sensitive subjects in South Africa (Zaayman, 2003). However, 
the possibility that regulatory or judicial insecurity can become an issue is unlikely, but non-
government actors could obstruct business activities from time to time (Control Risks, 2009). 
Issues around Black Economic Empowerment have often presented political risk factors 
(Acemoglu, 2007; Duffet, 2012) and this has usually come in the form of potential government 
intervention (Labonte, 2010; Essel, 2012). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Scenarios are a way of producing alternative futures based on various mixtures of assumptions, 
facts, trends and areas where extra understanding is needed for a particular scenario project 
(Herbst & Mills, 2006). A very good set of scenarios should leave the reader questioning which 
option is more likely or probable, thus causing the reader to think more. That is the whole point 
of a scenario (Herbst & Mills, 2006). Researchers should therefore structure and develop their 
scenarios to arguably educate and not to postulate the preferred future (Carpenter, Bennett & 
Peterson, 2006). Researchers, however, assert that these scenarios attempt to help detect, avoid 
and overcome possible dangers that may lie ahead, and to inform individuals by considering 
fragments of possible developments, options and dangers that may arise. Such researchers also 
emphasise that exploring these alternative futures should be done with the goal of improving the 
welfare of humankind and the sustainability of the earth (Bell, 2001; Moll, 2000). Bell (2001) 
indicates that any future is a consequence of present actions of people and that the present day is 
constantly being reconstructed as people act, react and interact. Therefore, to understand how 
these consequences might unfold, the researcher must understand other’s actions and reactions, 
and forces beyond control (Bell, 2001). As result of this, researchers contribute to informed and 
wise actions in our present day by studying possible future scenarios, distinguishing between 
possible, probable and preferable future scenarios (Bell, 2001).  
This article presents four scenarios to better understand South Africa’s future for the next 40 
years: the ‘Mandela’s Dream Scenario’ in which positive fundamentals come to function and are 
equally beneficial; ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Scenario’ in which less good governance 
prevails, but where a fortunate environment and firm national management allow South Africa to 
become competitive and benefit from satisfactory economic growth; the ‘Pyramid Syndrome 
Scenario’, in which core driving forces unfold at an uneven pattern, or have a varied impact on 
South Africa; and finally, the ‘Historical African Syndrome’ in which negative regional drivers 
of change cause the decay of positive initiatives in a method which compounds the pre-existing 
pressures to South Africa’s development towards 2055. 
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and security were a way of life for all her citizens. Mandela’s biggest hope for South Africa was 
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environment to produce strong economic growth. Under such conditions, South Africa can reap 
the benefits of a government that delivers social and judicial services everywhere, one that 
upgrades social and economic infrastructure and maintains security for all. It is a country which
maintains high standards of democracy – a far cry from her dark and politically unstable past. 
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indicates that any future is a consequence of present actions of people and that the present day is 
constantly being reconstructed as people act, react and interact. Therefore, to understand how 
these consequences might unfold, the researcher must understand other’s actions and reactions, 
and forces beyond control (Bell, 2001). As result of this, researchers contribute to informed and 
wise actions in our present day by studying possible future scenarios, distinguishing between 
possible, probable and preferable future scenarios (Bell, 2001).  
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become competitive and benefit from satisfactory economic growth; the ‘Pyramid Syndrome 
Scenario’, in which core driving forces unfold at an uneven pattern, or have a varied impact on 
South Africa; and finally, the ‘Historical African Syndrome’ in which negative regional drivers 
of change cause the decay of positive initiatives in a method which compounds the pre-existing 
pressures to South Africa’s development towards 2055. 













Source: Adendorff & Collier (2015: 134) 
HISTORICAL AFRICAN 
SYNDROME 
44 Journal for Development and Leadership
economy and new technologies used in buildings for infrastructure and government. Finally,
South Africa is a place that our best leader, Mr Mandela, can be proud of, her people can rejoice 
in and her future citizens can look forward to.
Second scenario – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
The second scenario which will be mapped out is titled ‘the Good the Bad and the Ugly’. In this 
scenario although the South African government benefits from reasonably sound governance, it
is, however, less fortunate in regional environment and less resolute in economic growth. 
Recovery efforts are hampered by external forces, although the South Africa government adopts 
sound governance and economic policies. There is large room for improvement, yet all hope is 
not lost. A large portion of the government budget goes towards eradicating poverty; however, a 
cloud of civil unrest simmers above the head of the nation. Illicit mining and trade continue, and 
South Africa is hampered further by ethnic and cultural tensions and economic disparities. There 
is much work to be done in this South Africa, a place where the investment climate is seen as a 
high risk, and where the pendulum of peace can swing either way. The economy remains 
uncompetitive and investment potentials remain unfulfilled. The rejuvenation of a country once 
plagued by apartheid is slow, yet continues to move forward by investing in security 
enforcement, good and free education and well governed and balanced infrastructure 
development. There is a glimmer of hope for the nation, as she moves precariously and slowly 
upward towards 2055. However, in this scenario it is believed that the South African economy 
did recover a sufficient growth potential early, when people strengthened their expectations about 
their future through good governance. Implementing all structural reforms that aimed towards a 
competitive society thriving on global trends and putting the bubble economy completely behind 
South Africa were instrumental in enhancing this movement. Considering labour input capital 
stock, and technological progress (total factor productivity), the South Africa economy was still 
able to grow by around 2 per cent per year.
Towards 2055, South Africa also has a working and liberal economic system; however, it has 
failed to develop a differentiated production and service economy. The raw material-dominated 
industrial complex still constitutes a substantial part of the economy. The development of a 
strong middle class, something important in every economy, has been hampered by a lack of 
diversification of domestic industry. Regular economic downturns depress the globalisation, 
growth and social development throughout South Africa and, for that matter, in Africa. Whilst 
this has been happening within the economy, the demographic drivers in South Africa mean there 
is still a demand for in-migration in key sectors such as elderly care. The pressure for migration
has increased, driven by lower growth, scarcity of critical resources, declining living standards 
and lower productivity. These pressures exist in a policy environment hostile to international 
cooperation that leads to tighter boarder policies and more control over migration-related matters. 
Towards 2055, long-term domestic and foreign investments are important for South Africa, and 
therefore clearer strategies for obtaining both are needed. However, the difficult economic 
environment poised on the national and provincial investment agencies, from developmental 
funding to youth funding, make capital hard to come by. The inability to attract high levels of 
investment and the inefficiency of local funding insure that the wealth of South Africa remains
with a few elites. The reason for this is that diversity in management has not been achieved 
anywhere in the economy, something South Africa has battled to achieve since 1994. The 
government and senior management have been predominately black, whereas the private sector 
remains in the hands of white South Africans, throwing much needed diversity off balance. The 
South African government has become more comfortable with outsourcing aspects of high 
priority services, such as social grant payments, hospital provision, and the running of prisons, 
housing, schools and universities to the private sector.
South Africa has become a much safer place to live in towards 2055, as government has taken 
precautions to strengthen our security, law and policing systems. South Africa is now a place free 
from the shackles of crime, corruption, illegal trade and trafficking. As a democratic country, 
South Africa’s governance has drastically improved, allowing all her citizens to walk in South 
Africa’s diverse and vibrant streets, free from the worry of crime. As is fitting of a democratic 
country, South Africa’s law regulations have also been adjusted accordingly to protect and 
defend all South African citizens. South Africa has made provision for security and justice and 
her people are hopeful of political leaders, as they strive to maintain their country’s law and 
order.  
Towards 2055 in South Africa, a sustainable livelihood has been built, increasing the 
productivity of the increasing 56 million people living in South Africa. Many efforts were placed 
on the support and building of education, health, information and knowledge, as well as access to 
finance, and other means of living towards 2055. Citizens’ food supply, assets and income 
became a concern of the then government during the 2010s.. It was because of this that specific 
lead programmes became prioritised. Amongst these programmes was the building of effective 
and qualified developmental local governments representing all culture groups, which has been 
discussed and argued to be the most important change needing to take place in order to reach the 
South Africa dreamt of by Mandela. Another programme of importance brought in by the ruling 
party was the redeployment of experienced senior public servants of all culture groups from 
provincial and national levels, as well as secondments from the NGO and private sectors. These 
experienced and qualified public servants were redeployed into this new developmental local 
government, set on the creation of a true new rainbow nation, capable of having her own footing 
on an international level. This developmental role of local government has then succeeded in its 
aim to improve, plan, and ensure integrated service delivery and insure participation by 
communities in identifying their own priorities in the planning process towards 2055. 
The encouragement of global private investment in resourceful and current telecommunications, 
transport infrastructure and energy supply has enabled the upgrading of the economic 
infrastructure together with the social infrastructure. South Africa is now enjoying a lifestyle 
never dreamed of prior to 2013. She is now a country which supplies 80 per cent of her people 
with clean drinking water, as well as the upgrade of clinics, schools, classrooms, roads, police 
stations and other transport infrastructure. South Africa has become a place where her truly 
democratic, well-trained, productive and effective leadership is an example to the rest of the 
world. 
In summary and towards 2055, South Africa will no longer have poverty traps in rural areas and 
urban townships; workers isolated on the periphery of cities; inner cities controlled by slumlords 
and crime; sterile suburbs with homes surrounded by high walls and electric fences; households 
spending 30 per cent or more of their time, energy and money on daily commuting; decaying 
infrastructure with power blackouts, undrinkable water, potholes and blocked sewers; violent 
protests; gridlocked roads and unreliable public transport; new public housing in barren urban 
landscapes; new private investment creating exclusive enclaves for the rich; fearful immigrant 
communities living in confined spaces; or rural communities dying as local production collapses. 
Instead, South Africa will have productive farms; well governed villages, towns and cities; 
tolerance; democracy; fairness and respect for the environment; citizen-centred services; secure 
water and food supplies; diverse and cleaner energy supplies; more walking and cycling; security 
barriers coming down in suburbs as people reclaim their streets; a mix of housing types and 
tenures to meet different needs; energy-efficient homes; fewer private cars on the roads and 
decent public transport; public spaces where people from different social groups mix; well-
maintained infrastructure supporting dynamic businesses and vibrant economies; recycled waste 
generating renewable energy; young people actively engaged in local decision-making; 
immigrant communities making a contribution; rural areas fully integrated into the local 
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economy and new technologies used in buildings for infrastructure and government. Finally,
South Africa is a place that our best leader, Mr Mandela, can be proud of, her people can rejoice 
in and her future citizens can look forward to.
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scenario although the South African government benefits from reasonably sound governance, it
is, however, less fortunate in regional environment and less resolute in economic growth. 
Recovery efforts are hampered by external forces, although the South Africa government adopts 
sound governance and economic policies. There is large room for improvement, yet all hope is 
not lost. A large portion of the government budget goes towards eradicating poverty; however, a 
cloud of civil unrest simmers above the head of the nation. Illicit mining and trade continue, and 
South Africa is hampered further by ethnic and cultural tensions and economic disparities. There 
is much work to be done in this South Africa, a place where the investment climate is seen as a 
high risk, and where the pendulum of peace can swing either way. The economy remains 
uncompetitive and investment potentials remain unfulfilled. The rejuvenation of a country once 
plagued by apartheid is slow, yet continues to move forward by investing in security 
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upward towards 2055. However, in this scenario it is believed that the South African economy 
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their future through good governance. Implementing all structural reforms that aimed towards a 
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stock, and technological progress (total factor productivity), the South Africa economy was still 
able to grow by around 2 per cent per year.
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industrial complex still constitutes a substantial part of the economy. The development of a 
strong middle class, something important in every economy, has been hampered by a lack of 
diversification of domestic industry. Regular economic downturns depress the globalisation, 
growth and social development throughout South Africa and, for that matter, in Africa. Whilst 
this has been happening within the economy, the demographic drivers in South Africa mean there 
is still a demand for in-migration in key sectors such as elderly care. The pressure for migration
has increased, driven by lower growth, scarcity of critical resources, declining living standards 
and lower productivity. These pressures exist in a policy environment hostile to international 
cooperation that leads to tighter boarder policies and more control over migration-related matters. 
Towards 2055, long-term domestic and foreign investments are important for South Africa, and 
therefore clearer strategies for obtaining both are needed. However, the difficult economic 
environment poised on the national and provincial investment agencies, from developmental 
funding to youth funding, make capital hard to come by. The inability to attract high levels of 
investment and the inefficiency of local funding insure that the wealth of South Africa remains
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Towards 2055, South Africa’s economy has reached prosperity without any political reform or an 
effective government. Despite favourable conditions and excellent economic growth, 
accumulated debt weighs heavily on South Africa’s shoulders. Poor planning and coordination
and bureaucratic inertia overlaid with startling levels of animosity among politicians have started 
to filter through to the still strong performing economy. This is largely because the divisive 
events of the black-dominated ANC and complex court cases due to poor governance result in 
continuing hostility and suspicion in the ruling party. Cracks within the government itself are 
beginning to emerge, which come with worrying effects for the South African economy and all 
its citizens. For a while, South Africa enjoyed the benefits of sound economic growth, driven by
a more stable global economy. With the South African government not succeeding, it is clear that 
the failure has been due to negligible consequences of inefficiency, corruption, poor productivity 
and bad governance. Unions and political connections protect the poor performers. Cleverer but 
less productive staff take advantage of the uncertainties at senior management level. The key 
performance agreement is honoured mostly in the breach and eventually collapses towards 2055. 
South Africa is in desperate need of a new government and educated people to take over the reins 
of a nation in desperate need of guidance. 
The South African government made a feeble effort to get corruption under control, as corruption 
has worked in their favour at all levels by letting tenders go to companies with overt connections 
to well- positioned individual and culture groups within the ruling party. The government 
celebrates vulgar displays of wealth and privilege while the majority of the country live without 
electricity, clean running water or inadequate sanitation. The power-hungry rule a nation plagued
by poverty and heart-breaking issues such as HIV and AIDS, all the while taking tax money 
away from those who need it to survive. Thus the Pyramid Syndrome.
Towards 2055 the South African government no longer plays a significant role in managing the 
country’s legislature. Law enforcement has been decentralised and is in many cases carried out 
by private crime fighters hired by individuals and corporations alike. The concept of the social 
welfare state is also a distant memory; individualism and materialistic gains are the main driving 
forces in the economy. South Africa is involved in African guerrilla war-type governance, where 
each citizen is forced to defend his or her best interests, as all faith in the South African 
government and the civil services, or lack thereof, has been lost. The demise of social and 
political justice has increased the polarisation of wealth, resulting in strong divides in society. Far 
behind in technological development, social and political mechanisms have hopelessly failed to 
cope with technological change. Politics, government, law and justice systems have been harder 
to update because they were highly based in strong cultural paradigms. Paradoxically, the 
globalisation has contributed by making national legal systems irrelevant and global legal 
systems impractical because it is impossible to reach agreements owing to the same cultural 
diversity.
Towards 2055, South Africa has become wealthier as global GDP grows but less happy as the 
differences between the haves and have-nots have become starker and increasingly immutable. 
South Africa is increasingly denned by two self-reinforcing cycles, one virtuous, leading to 
greater prosperity, the other vicious, leading to poverty and instability with political and social 
tensions increasing. Among South Africans there are clear-cut winners and losers. South Africa 
has splintered and eventually falters.
Fourth scenario – the Historical African Syndrome
South Africa fares less well in the fourth scenario, ‘the Historical African Syndrome’. The 
country continues suffering from a one-sided bad government, continued personal greed and 
internal and external conflict, drifting from crisis to crisis, mostly of its own making. 
Unfortunately, South Africa is on the same path of destruction as some of the poorest countries in 
the world. Initial attempts at rehabilitation and stability do not work, worsened by an influx of 
The problem experienced during this scenario is that education and health are highly privatised
and therefore only the rich elite can afford education and health services. The majority of the 
citizens living in rural areas are left uneducated, and unhealthy with fearsome diseases, issues
which remain unacceptable. Owing to the high levels of illiteracy towards 2055, the majority of 
the population lack basic skills. The consequence of such neglect is that rural communities lack
access to basic needs such as water, food, education, health care, sanitation and security. The 
things which many South Africans take for granted are foreign concepts to the majority of the 
country, living mere kilometres away. It is owing to these horrific circumstances that South 
Africa suffers from low life expectancy levels and high infant mortality rates towards 2055. 
These conditions, rightly considered unacceptable by the majority of rural dwellers, have been
contested, resulting in higher crime rates, conflict and cultural differences. Despite a commitment 
to better government, and to the more effective redistribution of wealth, the reality of a slowing 
economy makes it difficult for South Africa to keep up with the expectations it has itself created. 
It is common for governments worldwide to promise things they are unable to deliver. In the case 
of South Africa, job and poverty targets have failed miserably. Weak physical infrastructure has
also been a key factor that has prevented South Africa from successfully integrating into global 
trading systems. Poor infrastructure accounted for 40 per cent of transport costs for coastal 
provinces and 60 per cent for landlocked provinces. It can therefore be argued that South Africa 
has failed to expand services fast enough to keep up with rapid demographic growth and 
urbanisation owing to poor economic conditions. Perhaps one of the greatest reasons South 
Africa has not reached her true potential is the continuation of a few elite–sponsored BBBEE 
business agreements. Towards 2055, in most capitalist-driven nations the gap between the haves 
and have-nots is constantly expanding, a notion not foreign in South Africa. 
In summary, towards 2055 a common platform of fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency has been established with the view to effectively utilising public resources. 
However, low levels of openness and weak economic conditions have prevented South Africans 
from striking the partnerships with the rest of the world that would make a meaningful 
contribution to regional human capital development. In this scenario, there are few foreign and 
local joint ventures, with the result that local people are not exposed to best international 
practices. Low levels of openness have become a result of South Africa’s failure in negotiating 
for market access to more developed and higher income communities. As a result of this, South 
Africa has not opened up enough quality of labour in the country. The export and import efforts 
of South Africa as a percentage of real GDP have eventually gone into decline towards 2055.
Third scenario – Pyramid Syndrome
In the ‘Pyramid Syndrome’, a less significant government than in that of ‘the Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly’ prevails, especially in the early years with a selected few corrupt government autocrats 
filling up their personal coffers, but a fortunate economic environment and firm national 
management have allowed the Republic of South Africa to become competitive and benefit from 
satisfactory economic growth. Initially, dissatisfaction crept in due to the ruling party’s inability 
to deliver social rehabilitation and employment, or to eliminate corruption and nepotism. 
Towards 2055, the citizens of South Africa refused to live under such governmental rule and the 
weaknesses of this rule have led to widespread protest, backed by western interests. There is a
new political arena fighting for a more disciplined regime whereby draconian measures can
eventually be brought in to stamp out corruption and illicit operations, bringing back the rule of 
law and government authority, although civil rights, transparency and the social sectors backing 
security, education and infrastructure development receive lower priority. However, seeing that
economic growth of around 5 to 6 per cent year on end could address poverty, the government 
has been forced to work with multinationals and international agencies to modernise 
infrastructure, to utilise natural resources, and to successfully stimulate much needed growth.
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new political arena fighting for a more disciplined regime whereby draconian measures can
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systems especially have suffered from government neglect, and widespread dysfunction in local 
governments has prompted public demonstrations, which in most places have been countered 
with police violence. Peaceful protest is a thing of the past as citizens opt for a more violent 
approach in getting their pleas across. These problems have been compounded by the ANC’s 
policy of ‘deployment’, whereby the selection of candidates for government jobs at all levels is 
inordinately influenced by the candidates’ perceived loyalty to the ANC rather than by the 
possession of requisite professional qualifications. South Africa is not only being led by corrupt 
government officials, but by uneducated ones at that.
Although South Africans have celebrated the diversity of their cultures since 1994, there is no 
real substance to their traditional practices; as towards 2055 these have become perfunctory. The 
vital connection between the individual and insular race-based traditional cultures has forever
been lost when South African society retreated into structured hierarchical racial lines. Towards 
2055 as part of bad governance and poor economic conditions, the health system is struggling to 
cope with the collision of four excessive health burdens: communicable disease (especially 
HIV/AIDS); non-communicable disease; maternal, neonatal and child deaths; and deaths from 
injury and violence. These health problems are rooted in distinctive features of South Africa’s
poor governed strategic planning to cater for the poor. The migrant labour system has resulted in 
dispossession and impoverishment of the majority black population and has contributed too many 
of the major health problems through social changes which has led to the destruction of family 
life, alcohol abuse, and violence, particularly gender-based violence. Vast income inequalities 
have also resulted from the cumulative effects of wide-ranging discrimination and an array of 
racially-based BBBEE legislation.
Towards 2055 the South African country’s infrastructure has also taken a catastrophic turn as 
more than 80 per cent of the country’s citizens have no clean drinking water and sanitation is at 
its worst. The consumption of municipal potable water and the disposal of sewage into municipal 
systems have not been minimised and increased storm water runoff and water pollution have not 
been avoided towards 2055, causing greater risk of waterborne diseases. The government has 
neglected to improve the infrastructure of the roads and railways, leading to a high number of 
road deaths due to potholes and torn roads. The disastrous state of South Africa’s roads has
further been caused by poor management and unavailable funds to reconstruct and maintain them 
- the story of a country fuelled by governmental greed.
Medical services are also deteriorating rapidly and some South Africans have had to leave the 
country to seek medical treatment. Signs of the healthcare crisis have been obvious for some time 
to the few doctors still available in the country's hospitals. The international community that 
normally intervenes in situations like these are unwelcome now in South Africa, unless the 
underlying political problems can be solved. Hospitals have become seriously understaffed as 
nurses and doctors leave for more stable jobs abroad. Surgeons and anaesthesiologists have 
stopped doing any state- sponsored operations to protest about the poor working conditions and 
inadequate supplies. The surgeons say they are afraid of ruining their reputations by continuing 
to lose patients by going into theatre without adequate government supplies and equipment. 
While doctors and even members of parliament blame the government for the crisis, the 
government lacks political commitment and will.
In summary, it turns out that the majority of the government have absolutely no knowledge of 
economy and perceived good governance. They are totally incapable of satisfying even their own 
personal needs. As a result, the majority of enterprises have been closed and abandoned and 
South Africa has become like the rest of historical Africa.
more refugees from countries with the same or worsened plight from all over Africa. The South 
African government cannot deliver non-corrupt, well-managed services; education is poor;
humanitarian aid declines; food production does not recover; governance is inequitable; and civil 
unrest grows. Young men of all culture groups return to fighting; the brain drain thrives. Poor 
macroeconomic management brings inflation and a lack of public resources; investors avoid 
South Africa and donors withdraw. In the lawless environment HIV/AIDS and disease escalate. 
There are coups d’état and war, religious fundamentalism and cultural terrorism and continued 
links to international crime. The main losers are the desperately poor people, helplessly caught in 
a maelstrom of conflict and the ambitions of local and selfish leaders. They are the ones who are
once again burdened by an ill-qualified and corrupt government. By 2055, with yet another civil 
war, the cycle of violence and despair repeats itself over, and over.
Towards 2055, several South African economically depressed cycles are in full swing and 
economic activity reaches an all-time low. This is the worst-case scenario with high inflation and
unemployment figures, referred to as ‘stagflation’. This leads to double-digit interest rates for 
several years until inflation goes down to most reasonable levels. While stocks suffer greatly, 
lands do even worse. Citizens feel the burn of an unstable economy. By 2055 South Africa has 
been predominantly shaped by long periods of economic instability, as economic growth stalls in 
South Africa. Instead of collaboration and mutual understanding between cultures, many South 
Africans are facing a breakdown within their own structures. It is a chaotic period for the South 
African country, as gated cities emerged. Citizens no longer felt safe in their cities, opting to live 
behind electric fences and high walls. By 2055, although there are many corporations in South 
Africa, they seem to behave like predators. Resources are used with no respect for the natural 
environment, as the land and her animals are abused, killed and squandered. There is a marked 
lack of cooperation between corporate and communities. Instead, there is a clash of interests and 
a general lack of understanding, or respect, on both sides. The people of South Africa have been 
struggling under the burden of economic hardships as they have been extremely despondent with 
the one-sided and black dominated political situation, since the country has been run by the few 
ruling elite who are exploiting it to serve their own needs. Government officials live in lavish 
homesteads while their people suffer. This picture of pathos will break many a heart 
internationally. Well-remunerated government appointments and top positions also seem to go to 
people who are well placed with the government, regardless of merit, qualification and 
experience. Government has failed to deliver on its promises of family support, refurbishment of
schools, health facilities, housing or clean drinking water because of inefficiency, corrupt 
practices, arrogance and an influx of refugees. 
Towards 2055, South Africa has become a lawless country where anger and violence are rife. 
South Africa is now caught in a downward spiral, fanning the flames of ethnic animosity and 
witnessing the formation of ethnic militias. Widespread corruption continues unabated. The 
youth of South Africa have no jobs – those who have survived the AIDS scourge, that is. The 
youth who stay at home all day become depressed and apathetic, turning to crime as the only
alternative. Armed gangs emerge throughout the South African country, the Constitutional crisis 
deteriorates and regional conflicts escalate and threaten to spread. Enormous pressure is brought 
to bear on the South African country. The populace is no longer confident in the ability of the 
one-sided state’s government to enforce the law and many South Africans are taking no account 
of it in the running of their affairs. Instead, they rely more and more on informal establishments, 
based largely on ethic allegiances. To aggravate matters further, the South African government 
has lost its capacity to enforce the law – it can no longer hold together different groups in the 
delicate balance of power and rewards.
South Africa is in a no better position to where they were forty years prior, having learnt nothing 
from her many years of hardships. Meanwhile, national development and the delivery of services 
to citizens have lagged despite ANC leaders’ earnest campaign promises. Health and education 
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underlying political problems can be solved. Hospitals have become seriously understaffed as 
nurses and doctors leave for more stable jobs abroad. Surgeons and anaesthesiologists have 
stopped doing any state- sponsored operations to protest about the poor working conditions and 
inadequate supplies. The surgeons say they are afraid of ruining their reputations by continuing 
to lose patients by going into theatre without adequate government supplies and equipment. 
While doctors and even members of parliament blame the government for the crisis, the 
government lacks political commitment and will.
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS 2055
The proposed four scenarios above are multifaceted, and many more comparisons and messages 
can be elaborated. The proposed scenarios are not predictions, but merely four possible stories of 
how South Africa could develop, based on important variables and uncertainties. The 
significance of these scenarios is to learn from them in setting the strategic agenda for the future.
Humankind’s understanding of what drives national prosperity has evolved over time. Natural 
resources, population growth, industrialisation, globalisation, geography, economics and 
productivity might all have played a role in the past. Researchers also know that the relative 
importance of these drivers has shifted over time, and that in recent decades, more importance 
has been given to the coherence and quality of policies and the development of supporting 
institutions (López-Claros & Mata, 2010). A relative newcomer to this debate, identified as 
perhaps one of the most important modern engines of productivity and growth, has been the 
innovation excellence of a country; that is, its industries, researchers, developers, creative 
thinkers, enlightened politicians, managers, and clusters (Ferguson, 2008; UN, 2012; World 
Bank, 2013).
As presented in the scenarios above, the future is, however, open to great potential, depending on 
South Africa’s actions and inactions. It is the choice of South Africans to therefore choose which 
path to follow in terms of future development as a nation. If good policies are implemented and 
all work scrupulously, Mandela’s dream should be achieved. If, on the other hand, bad policies 
are implemented, South Africa will persist in falling behind with the associated consequences of 
poor human and social development.
South Africa’s leaders, professionals, entrepreneurs and decision-makers alike all owe its citizens
aspects such as ethics, honesty, respect, trustworthiness and not doing harm to anyone or 
anything. Leaders should strive to implement moral obligations to improve the public welfare 
and to add additional moral burdens that apply specifically to carrying out one’s role as a
professional, as well as to serving the people of South Africa. Decision-makers therefore, have 
to maintain and improve the well-being of its current citizens, and those of the future, as well as 
the life-sustaining capacities of the earth. In South Africa, one of the most efficient prevention 
strategies of future unrest or even rebellion is jobs (Herbst & Mills, 2006). South Africa, a 
country rising out of conflict, has to ensure such jobs - to build on the basics to ensure firstly, that 
they are in place, including human and hard infrastructure such as roads, transport, medical 
facilities, electricity and ports; and secondly, that the traditional drivers of economic activity are 
completely restored. Since South Africa has been blessed with some natural resources, it will 
have to meet the challenge of investing these proceeds and diversifying its economic base.
South Africa has many obstacles to overcome before any developmental milestones are 
achieved. The country is not only limited by good governance standards, but still has elements of 
corruption, crime, low life expectancies, uneducated population, failed infrastructure and poor
access to technology. This list still needs to be addressed in order to spark development for South 
Africa towards 2055. Economic well-being has the apparent potential to develop the health of 
the population, access to sanitation and clean water as well as access to technology. If South 
Africa can focus on improving its governance efforts, the chances of positive development will 
be greater (Gopal & Tyler, 2010).
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corruption, crime, low life expectancies, uneducated population, failed infrastructure and poor
access to technology. This list still needs to be addressed in order to spark development for South 
Africa towards 2055. Economic well-being has the apparent potential to develop the health of 
the population, access to sanitation and clean water as well as access to technology. If South 
Africa can focus on improving its governance efforts, the chances of positive development will 
be greater (Gopal & Tyler, 2010).
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STIGMATISATION, SOCIAL SUPPORT 
AND HEALTH-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR 
AMONG PERSONS LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS 
IN A HEALTH FACILITY IN ILORIN, NIGERIA
A.A. Arazeem1, B. Jayeola-Omoyeni2 & R.A. Gbadeyan3
ABSTRACT
Quantum of studies has shown that the major set-back in HIV treatment is the issue of stigma and 
discrimination. This study examined the experience of stigmatisation by persons living with 
HIV/AIDS in a health facility in Nigeria as well as the relationship between social support and 
health care-seeking behaviour. A total of 210 respondents participated in the study. Data were 
gathered using questionnaires and in-depth interviews (IDI). Incidentally, 90 per cent and 87.5 
per cent of the respondents indicated that they did not experience any form of stigma and 
discrimination among friends or at places of work respectively. Non-experience of stigma and 
discrimination was due to non-disclosure of HIV status. A total of 66 per cent of the respondents 
revealed that their participation in the group activities enabled them to receive social support 
needed to cope with their health conditions. The majority of the respondents (89.5%) revealed 
that the caring attitudes of care providers also encouraged them to comply with treatment. Thus, 
regression analysis shows a positive relationship between group support and group participation 
(p<0.05) as well as group participation and health care seeking behaviour (p<0.05). The study 
recommends effective group activities among PLHIV and by extension people with similar 
diseases. 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS; group membership; social support; social capital; PLHIV.
INTRODUCTION
HIV/AIDS remains one of the major public health problems in Nigeria. More than 3 million 
Nigerians are still living with the virus with the prevalence rate standing at 4 per cent (National 
Action Committee on AIDS [NACA], 2012). In view of the incidence and prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, Nigeria remains the second hardest hit by HIV/AIDS country in Africa 
and the third in the world (NACA, 2012). Activities to combat HIV/AIDS in Nigeria have been 
scaled up, especially in recent times. However, the fight against HIV/AIDS is believed to be 
suffering a setback owing to the problem of stigma and discrimination often experienced by the 
people who are living with the virus. In most Nigerian communities, people living with 
HIV/AIDS are still socially and structurally disadvantaged. In most of these communities, 
HIV/AIDS is still associated with promiscuity, evil and even death. In indigenous communities, 
persons living with HIV are still widely considered immoral and treated with disrespect. 
Sometimes they are ostracised and openly disgraced by their own people. 
While immediate family members and friends are usually the first to discriminate against an 
infected individual, persons living with HIV (PLHIV) in Nigeria may also suffer what is called 
institutional discrimination from care providers in the health sector. Institutional discrimination 
may include deliberate neglect, differential treatment, denial of care, delivery of poor quality 
treatment, early discharge from the hospital, segregation of hospital wards, isolation, and the 
1Dr A.A. Arazeem, Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.
2Mr B. Jayeola-Omoyeni, Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.
3Dr R.A. Gbadeyan, Department of Business Administration and Marketing, University of Ilorin,
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